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AbsTrACT
Consumer protection in most domains of financial regulation centers on transparency. 
Broadly construed, transparency involves making relevant information available to 
consumers as well as others who might act on their behalf, such as academics, journalists, 
newspapers, consumer organizations, or other market watchdogs.  By contrast, 
command-and-control regulation that affirmatively limits financial firms’ products or 
pricing is relatively uncommon.  This Article describes an anomalous inversion of this 
pattern: While state insurance regulation frequently employs aggressive command-
and-control consumer protection regulation, it typically does little or nothing to 
promote transparent markets.  Rather, state lawmakers routinely either completely 
ignore transparency-oriented reforms or implement them in a flawed manner.  While 
acknowledging the limits of transparency-oriented consumer protection regulation, this 
Article argues that the lack of transparent insurance markets reflects a pervasive and 
unappreciated flaw in state insurance regulation.  Despite their limitations, transparency-
oriented regulatory strategies are an important complement to other more aggressive 
regulatory tools because they can promote consumer choice, harness market discipline, 
and ensure regulatory accountability in ways that more aggressive regulatory tools often 
cannot.  In order to promote more transparent insurance markets, the Article argues 
that the jurisdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should be expanded 
to encompass consumer protection in insurance.
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INTRODUCTION 
A central goal of financial regulation is to promote markets that are more 
transparent for consumers and retail investors.  Consumer protections in banking 
consequently focus predominantly on disclosures,1 and securities law aims to pro-
tect retail investors principally through disclosure and antifraud rules.2  Although 
the subprime mortgage crisis revealed important limitations to these approaches,3 
federal financial regulation has hardly abandoned transparency as a consumer 
protection priority.  To the contrary, it has embraced the need for better and 
more empirically informed transparency initiatives, while acknowledging that 
these efforts must often be paired with complementary substantive restrictions.4 
One domain of financial regulation, however, has consistently and repeat-
edly failed to embrace market transparency as a regulatory tool: state insurance 
regulation.  In both property/casualty and life insurance—the two insurance are-
nas that the states predominantly regulate5—lawmakers and regulators have rou-
tinely resisted transparency-oriented consumer protections, even though 
  
1. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
349 (4th ed. 2009). 
2. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the 
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1043 (2009) (describing securities law’s “habitual use 
of the disclosure remedy for purposes of retail investor protection”). 
3. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS 
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 196–98 (2011); Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 
4. For instance, while the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) enjoys 
broad regulatory authority, many of its initial efforts have focused on producing better 
consumer disclosures of mortgages and student loans while increasing the information 
available to market watchdogs.  See generally Thomas P. Brown, Disclosure—An Unappreciated 
Tool in the CFPB’s Arsenal, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 209 (2011).  In 2009, the Credit Card Ac-
countability and Responsibility and Disclosure Act amended the Truth in Lending Act to 
require credit card companies to post their contracts online and to disclose on billing 
statements the interest-rate costs of making only minimum payments.  Truth in Lending Act of 
1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2012).  And healthcare reform focuses a substantial and underappreciated 
amount of attention on improving transparency in health insurance markets through the 
development of better summary disclosures, the establishment of exchanges, and the 
mandatory publication of claim payment information.  See Karen Pollitz & Larry Levitt, 
Health Insurance Transparency Under the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/health-insurance-
transparency-under-the-affordable-care-act.aspx.  
5. By virtue of the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012), states are the 
primary regulators of insurance markets when federal law does not expressly preempt this 
authority.  See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, ABRAHAM’S INSURANCE 
LAW AND REGULATION 32 (5th ed. Supp. 2010). 
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analogous safeguards are common in federal financial regulation.6  Thus, state-
regulated insurers are virtually never required to provide consumers with stand-
ardized summaries of key coverage terms before purchase.7  Insurers’ provision of 
rate information is largely unregulated, often preventing consumers from effec-
tively comparing premiums on an apples-to-apples basis.8  And state laws actually 
forbid insurers and their agents from informing consumers about the protections 
they enjoy through state guarantee funds.9 
Even more importantly, state laws and regulations do remarkably little to 
promote broad public availability of insurance market information.  For example, 
insurance carriers are not required to make their policies publicly accessible to any-
one other than existing policyholders.10  Similarly, regulators generally do not 
publish any company-specific information on how often individual carriers deny 
or delay claims, drop policyholders for making claims, rescind coverage, or charge 
surrender fees.11  And even the financial health of insurers is actively shrouded by 
state regulators.12 
While state insurance regulation generally shuns transparency-oriented 
consumer protection, it often embraces aggressive substantive regulation.  For in-
stance, states frequently (though unevenly) restrict insurers’ pricing decisions,13 
  
6. One other commentator has noted this pattern, at least with respect to the life insurance 
industry.  See Joseph M. Belth, The Disclosure Approach to the Problem of Deceptive Practices in 
the Life Insurance Industry, 21 INS. F. 81, 82–83 (1994) (“Insurance regulation is based on 
nondisclosure of material information to policyowners and prospective policyowners; the 
theory is that they will be protected by the regulators.  In contrast, securities regulation is 
based on disclosure of material information to investors and prospective investors; the theory 
is that they will protect themselves if they are given the important information.”).  
Additionally, Howell Jackson has noted that state insurance regulation tends to make use of 
much more aggressive regulatory tools than other forms of financial regulation, a result that 
he attributes to the relative complexity of insurance.  Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a 
Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 333–
34 (1999). 
7. See infra Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations; cf. 
Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 
1332–34 (2011) (discussing the lack of substantive information about coverage that insurers 
provide on a prepurchase basis). 
8. See infra Part III.D, Improving Consumer Understanding of the Cost of Cash-Value  
Life Policies. 
9. See infra Part III.A, Solvency Regulation. 
10. See Schwarcz, supra note 7; infra Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable 
Expectations.  
11. See infra Part III.B, Informing Consumers About Guarantee Fund Protection. 
12. See infra Part III.A, Solvency Regulation. 
13. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Anti-discrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2135800. 
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mandate specific policy provisions,14 require carriers to operate unprofitable poli-
cy lines,15 and insist on capital and reserve requirements that are based on unique-
ly conservative accounting standards.16  This suite of regulatory approaches often 
leads observers to note that insurance is the most heavily regulated of all financial 
sectors.17 
This inverted pattern of consumer protection regulation—aggressive command-
and-control rules combined with limited market transparency—is not simply 
anomalous.  It is dysfunctional.  Transparency-oriented consumer financial pro-
tection is, despite its limitations,18 a vital complement to other regulatory tools.  
Properly executed, transparency can help empower consumers to make better de-
cisions about how to purchase and use financial products.  Even more importantly, 
it can promote market discipline and facilitate “smart disclosure” to “fuel the crea-
tion of products and tools that benefit consumers.”19  To be sure, these benefits 
will often need supplementing by various more aggressive regulatory tools.  Unfor-
tunately, transparency-based regulation is often treated as a substitute for more 
aggressive forms of regulation.20  But this Article attempts to transcend this nar-
row perspective, emphasizing that transparency-based regulation is often a vital 
complement to effective substantive regulation. 
This Article demonstrates these points in the context of state insurance reg-
ulation, showing how regulator-facilitated transparency could substantially im-
prove the efficiency of insurance markets.  In some cases, transparency-based tools 
could almost certainly achieve regulatory objectives more effectively at less cost 
than current substantive regulations.  For example, enabling consumers to com-
pare prices meaningfully would be more effective and less expensive than state rate 
regulation.21  In most cases, though, the Article argues that enhanced market 
transparency would be an essential complement to substantive regulation.  It 
could allow sophisticated consumers, advocates, and journalists to police the 
  
14. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1270–71. 
15. Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 293, 300–08 (1999). 
16. See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against 
Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1763–64 n.256 (2010). 
17. See, e.g., J. David Cummins, Property-Liability Insurance Price Deregulation: The Last Bastion?, 
in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION 
AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 1 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002). 
18. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 723. 
19. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SMART DISCLOSURE AND CONSUMER DECISION 
MAKING: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SMART DISCLOSURE 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/report_of_the_task_force_on
_smart_disclosure.pdf; see infra Part I.B, Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline. 
20. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 681. 
21. See infra Part II.E, Affordable Insurance Rates and Improving Consumers’ Ability to Comparison Shop. 
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marketplace in tandem with regulators, empower informed consumers to make 
better choices among competing products, promote better consumer usage of 
their policies, and prompt more effective enforcement of substantive rules. 
Given the pervasive and longstanding failure of state lawmakers and regula-
tors to promote transparent insurance markets, this Article proposes that the ju-
risdiction of the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should 
be expanded to include insurance products.  The CFPB’s focus on market trans-
parency makes it well suited to tackle the opaqueness of state insurance markets.  
Perhaps even more importantly, extending the CFPB’s jurisdiction to insurance 
would motivate state insurance regulators to promote market transparency.  The 
history of state insurance regulation strongly suggests that state regulators can, 
and will, act when necessary to maintain the scope of their authority.22  The pros-
pect of federal preemption by CFPB regulation would thus likely force state in-
surance regulators to pay attention to the behaviorally and empirically informed 
principles of market transparency that are at the heart of modern consumer pro-
tection. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides an overview of transparency-
oriented consumer protection.  It argues that regulatory measures that directly 
seek to improve the decisions of individual consumers are an essential tool in reg-
ulators’ arsenal.  Even more significantly, Part I emphasizes the importance of full 
disclosure as a regulatory tool for promoting consumer financial protection.  Such dis-
closure aims to make large quantities of standardized market information broadly 
and easily available.  Its primary goal is not to directly inform consumers but ra-
ther to promote market discipline or smart disclosure by facilitating the efforts of 
market intermediaries. 
Parts II and III then focus on the lack of transparency-oriented consumer 
protection in property/casualty and life/annuity insurance markets, respectively.  
In both cases, state insurance regulation either completely forgoes transparency-
oriented approaches or relies on inadequate approaches, at least when federal law 
has not demanded otherwise.  By contrast, federal financial regulations in bank-
ing, securities, and health insurance domains employ more effective and thought-
ful strategies to promote market transparency.  Parts II and III argue that similar 
transparency-oriented reforms could effectively complement more aggressive 
forms of regulatory scrutiny. 
Part IV concludes by offering at least a partial explanation for why state in-
surance regulation has so consistently failed to develop transparency-oriented 
consumer protection and by describing how to remedy that failure.  Although 
  
22. See infra Part III, Adequacy of Transparency Regulation in Life Insurance and Annuities. 
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numerous factors seem to contribute to the blind spots of state insurance regula-
tion, Part IV concludes that this problem is amenable to a relatively simple and 
practical solution.  Empowering the CFPB to regulate state insurance markets 
would almost certainly cause states to pay more attention to the need for enhanced 
transparency in insurance markets.  And, to the extent that state efforts remain un-
satisfactory, the CFPB’s review and analysis of state insurance regulation would 
serve as an ideal precursor to a more generalized federalization of insurance regu-
lation. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF TRANSPARENCY-ORIENTED CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
Transparency-oriented consumer protection can be subdivided into two 
categories.23  The first seeks to increase awareness of relevant information by 
reaching consumers of insurance products directly.  Subpart A describes the 
potential benefits and limitations of this approach, focusing on four specific strate-
gies: summary disclosures, financial literacy education, antifraud and antideception 
measures, and structured products and markets.  Subpart B then moves to a se-
cond, and ultimately more promising, category of transparency-oriented con-
sumer protection: full disclosure that makes relevant information broadly and 
easily available to the public, reaching insurance consumers indirectly through 
various types of intermediaries.  This form of transparency can improve the disci-
plining force of firm reputation and enhance the incentives of regulators to proac-
tively identify and address market problems. 
A. Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking 
Many consumer financial protections are designed to deliver relevant in-
formation to individuals in order to improve their financial decisionmaking.  Un-
fortunately, accomplishing this is no easy task.  Consumers have limited cognitive 
resources and background knowledge to devote to understanding complex and 
ever-changing financial products.  Nonetheless, well-designed regulation can 
meaningfully improve consumer decisionmaking in a variety of settings.  This 
Subpart describes four regulatory tools for accomplishing this goal. 
  
23. Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 628–29 (2005); Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of 
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Heads of the Executive Departments and Agencies, 
Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory Tools (June 18, 2010), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf. 
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1. Summary Disclosures 
Summary disclosure is the most familiar regulatory tool for improving con-
sumer decisionmaking.  Such disclosure highlights specific information that is 
particularly important for making an informed financial decision.24  Most fre-
quently, this information concerns product attributes, such as fee schedules, pen-
alty terms, or other contract provisions.25  But it can also involve other 
information, such as expected consumer use patterns or the obligations and in-
centives of the seller/intermediary.26 
Historically, most attempts to mandate summary disclosures have proven 
ineffective.27  In large part, this is because lawmakers and regulators have often 
embraced mandatory disclosure as a regulatory tool without paying meaningful 
attention to its specific design and implementation.28  As a result, mandatory dis-
closures are often lengthy, complicated, and delivered to consumers after the 
point of sale, when consumers have little incentive to pay attention.29  Some 
prominent commentators have used this record of ineffectiveness to persuasively 
argue for the abandonment of mandatory consumer disclosures.30 
But despite their historical failings, mandatory consumer disclosures 
can indeed promote various specific regulatory goals if they are properly 
designed and executed.31  Numerous examples of successful mandatory 
disclosure exist, including nutritional food labeling,32 ATM fee disclo-
  
24. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 3. 
25. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3. 
26. See Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L. 
REV. 93, 98 (2010). 
27. See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3; William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred 
Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant With the Economic and Psychological 
Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1133–34 (1984) 
(arguing that Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosures are ineffective). 
28. Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for 
the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1163–64 (2012) (describing reasons 
many consumers failed to use disclosures and efforts by the CFPB to resolve the issues). 
29. See generally Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 
AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1291 (2011). 
30. See Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in 
Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 293 (2012).  See generally Ben-Shahar & 
Schneider, supra note 3. 
31. See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY (2007); Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to 
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 338 (2013). 
32. See, e.g., John Kozup et al., Sound Disclosures: Assessing When a Disclosure Is Worthwhile, 31 J. 
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 313, 316 (2012) (arguing that sound disclosures, such as 
nutritional food labeling, can achieve regulatory objectives). 
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sures,33 payday loan disclosures,34 mortgage disclosures,35 and consumer safety 
disclosures.36  These disclosures not only promote better consumer decisionma-
king but can also impact the firms’ behavior by altering their decisionmaking cal-
culus.37 
To be sure, no form of summary disclosure will be perfectly effective.  In-
deed, even some of the comparatively successful forms of mandatory disclosure 
described above have been heavily criticized in recent research.38  But in most of 
these cases, critics argue that these forms of disclosure are less effective than they 
could be; few commentators argue that these forms of disclosure are completely 
ineffective.39  To the contrary, if there is one theme that permeates the vast litera-
ture on summary disclosures, it is that their effectiveness is vitally contingent on 
their design and implementation.40 
  
33. See Adam J. Levitin, Consumer Finance: Law, Business and Policy (2013) (textbook draft) 
(finding that that consumers withdraw larger amounts at automatic teller machines when 
they are warned that a fee will be imposed on each withdrawal). 
34. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday 
Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1865–93 (2011) (finding in an experimental setting that short 
disclosures to payday loan consumers provided on the envelopes in which cash is disbursed 
can improve decisionmaking over time). 
35. James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer 
Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence From Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment With 
Mortgage Borrowers, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 516, 518–19 (2010) (finding that improved 
TILA disclosures can improve consumer decisionmaking). 
36. See Eli. P Cox III et al., Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior?: A Meta-analysis, 16 J. 
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 195, 201 (1997) (finding that product warnings can improve 
consumer safety). 
37. See Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 3, 6 (noting a study finding that after levels of trans fat were 
required to be disclosed on nutritional labels, food and beverage companies altered their 
production and advertising of products); see also Craswell, supra note 31, at 334 (labeling this 
effect, which he notes also is applicable to summary disclosure, as dynamic disclosure, because 
disclosure has the effect of impacting the choice sets available to consumers). 
38. See, e.g., Sophie Hieke & Charles R. Taylor, A Critical Review of the Literature on Nutritional 
Labeling, 46 J. CONSUMER AFF. 120 (2012); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information 
Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012) (arguing that the implementation of 
restaurant hygiene grading suffers serious flaws, including grade inflation and inconsistency). 
39. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 31, at 350. 
40. See, e.g., J. Craig Andrews, Warnings and Disclosures, in COMMUNICATING RISKS AND 
BENEFITS: AN EVIDENCE-BASED USER’S GUIDE 149 (Baruch Fischhoff et al. eds., 2011); 
David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 155 (2006); see also, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product-Use Information and 
the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235 (2012) (arguing that 
mandated disclosure of product-use information has substantial potential to improve 
consumer outcomes if designed effectively); Margaret C. Campbell et al., Can Disclosures 
Lead Consumers to Resist Covert Persuasion?: The Important Roles of Disclosure Timing and Type 
of Response, 4 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 23 (2013) (reporting that properly designed dis-
closure can correct the nefarious impact of covert product sponsorship). 
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Three basic principles for designing effective mandatory disclosures can be 
distilled from this literature.  First, disclosures must focus consumers’ attention 
on a small number of key pieces of information directed to solving specific regula-
tory problems.41  The reason is simple: Most consumers can or will process only a 
limited amount of information in a disclosure.42  In some cases, disclosures can 
overcome this limitation by combining relevant information into a simple rating 
or ranking.43  Examples include letter grades for restaurant cleanliness44 and rat-
ings for automobile safety and fuel efficiency.45  Alternatively, product use disclo-
sures can be embedded within product attribute disclosures so that consumers are 
simultaneously informed about both features when making their decisions.46  
Mandatory disclosures regarding automobile fuel efficiency and cigarette nicotine 
and tar levels fit this description.47 
Although it is the most vital element of designing an effective disclosure, 
determining the appropriate information to include in a disclosure is often im-
mensely difficult, particularly for inherently complicated products.  Some disclo-
sure metrics may invite gaming by firms, who seek to influence or confuse 
consumers by altering products in ways that change how they appear in disclo-
sures but do not improve consumer welfare.48  Other times, poorly designed dis-
closures can inadvertently reinforce behavioral biases by focusing consumer 
  
41. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1089 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of using disclosure to target specific regulatory problems). 
42. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in 
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 584 (2006) (“Increasing the prominence of a 
required disclosure may also reduce the attention consumers pay to other information . . . .”); Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1203, 1241–44 (2003). 
43. Of course, for these approaches to be effective, consumers must understand what the 
underlying metrics mean or, at the very least, how to compare ratings to determine which is 
purportedly better.  Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 5.  For example, 
there is evidence that many consumers do not understand what the annual percentage rate 
(APR) means or whether a higher or a lower APR is better.  See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Preventing 
Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act 
Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 776–77 (2010). 
44. See Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence From 
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409 (2003) (finding that restaurant hygiene grades 
in Los Angeles cause improved restaurant hygiene and increased consumer responsiveness to 
restaurant).  But see Ho, supra note 38 (arguing that implementation of restaurant hygiene grading 
suffers serious flaws). 
45. See Craswell, supra note 31, at 357. 
46. See Bar-Gill & Ferarri, supra note 26. 
47. See id. at 106–09.  
48. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 38, at 609–16 (showing how restaurants can game their ratings for 
hygiene and produce “grade inflation”); Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1049–50 (noting how 
mutual fund companies can frustrate cost comparisons by creating different types of fee 
arrangements). 
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attention on issues of secondary concern.49  But none of these results are inevita-
ble, particularly if regulators are attuned to these difficulties. 
Second, regulators should design and test mandatory summary disclosure 
forms that incorporate fields for individual firms to populate with relevant prod-
uct and/or consumer characteristics.50  Examples include nutritional food labels 
and recently revamped mortgage, credit card, and health insurance disclosures.  
When all firms use a centrally designed disclosure template, consumers can more 
easily compare product features and prices across companies.  Consumers are also 
much more likely to learn how to use uniform disclosure templates.  Finally, 
regulators can more efficiently test standard forms for consumer comprehen-
sion.51  Such testing is increasingly routine at federal agencies52 and helps ensure 
that consumers actually understand and can act on summary disclosures.53 
Third, consumers must receive consumer disclosures at the appropriate 
time, when they are most likely to capture consumers’ attention and inform their 
decisionmaking.54  Thus, consumers must receive disclosures intended to pro-
  
49. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1051 (noting how disclosures of past performance of 
mutual funds may enhance irrational trend chasing). 
50. See Brenda J. Cude & Daniel Schwarcz, Consumer Viewpoints on Effective Disclosures, CIPR 
NEWSL. (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs & Ctr. for Ins. Policy & Research, Kansas City, Mo.), 
Jan. 2013, at 26, 30, available at http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol6_ 
consumer_viewpoints.pdf (noting that regulator-designed disclosures create consistency across 
firms, making comparisons easier for consumers); Susan L. Rutledge, Consumer Protection 
and Financial Literacy: Lessons From Nine Country Studies 19–21 (World Bank Policy 
Research, Working Paper No. 5326, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619168.  
51. Ensuring effective consumer testing is very difficult when firms draft their own disclosures, as 
the number of disclosures that must be tested increases from one to the number of firms 
operating in the market place. 
52. See generally JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS (2007); see also Memorandum from 
Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 5, 7. 
53. See Kennedy et al., supra note 28, at 1160–67 (discussing federal efforts to improve mortgage 
loan disclosures).  Untested disclosures often prove ineffective because the experts who draft 
them are uniquely unsuited to determine what is comprehensible to ordinary consumers.  See, 
e.g., Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?, 
35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 42 (2009) (noting that a large number of healthcare disclosure forms 
are too complex for the average American adult); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, 
Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 240–41 (2002) (examining the literacy 
skill level required to understand consumer loan and automobile lease documents). 
54. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral 
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 694 (1996); 
Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 3–4.  But cf. Lauren E. Willis, 
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. 
REV. 707, 749–50 (2006) (describing the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
(HOEPA) mortgage disclosures, which are designed to facilitate comparison shopping and 
are provided only after the opportunity to comparison shop has passed). 
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mote comparison shopping before emotionally committing to a purchase or 
spending a substantial amount of time and energy learning about or applying for a 
product.  Similarly, disclosures designed to limit overdraft fees are most likely to 
be effective if they are delivered at the point of sale, at the time when purchase 
could cause consumers to exceed their credit limit.55  By contrast, disclosures in-
tended to alter long-term consumer behavior may be most usefully provided after 
the point of sale,56 when they are least likely to be undermined by sales people 
who may have incentives to downplay their relevance or importance.57  Finally, 
mandatory summary disclosures must be provided at a time when consumers will 
not be overwhelmed by other disclosures.58  To accomplish this, regulators should 
not only specify the time frames within which disclosures should be provided but 
also limit or prohibit providing additional disclosures to consumers at that time.  
To be sure, even mandatory disclosures that meet these criteria will only be 
imperfectly effective: Consumers will always err.  But mandatory disclosure is 
simply one tool in a regulator’s tool kit and can generally be employed in concert 
with other approaches, such as minimum product requirements or regulatory 
preapproval.  Additionally, mandatory disclosure has important advantages over 
other regulatory tools.  First, it does not interfere with consumer choice.  Second, 
and perhaps less fully appreciated, it can help consumers use products effectively.  
For instance, disclosure can encourage people to withdraw funds from automatic 
teller machines less frequently, to use overdraft protection only when truly need-
ed, or to refrain from submitting insurance claims that are only slightly above 
one’s deductible. 
2. Financial Literacy Education 
A second form of transparency-oriented consumer protection is financial 
literacy education, which can be defined as “education about financial concepts 
undertaken with the explicit purpose of increasing knowledge and the skills, con-
fidence, and motivation to use it.”59  Such education is designed to empower indi-
vidual consumers to make responsible financial decisions by equipping them with 
a core amount of financial literacy and the skills necessary to analyze individual 
  
55. See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF 
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 192 (2006). 
56. See Bertrand & Morse, supra note 34, at 1865–93 (finding that disclosures on envelopes 
containing cash had a gradual effect on consumers’ payday lending habits). 
57. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 739 (arguing that a disclosure mandate could 
backfire when the discloser has strategic reason to give false and biased assurances). 
58. See Craswell, supra note 42, at 581. 
59. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 202 (2008). 
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financial products.  It is generally provided before the point of purchase through 
classroom teaching, informational websites, and brochures or guides. 
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of financial literacy education is 
generally not encouraging.  Most studies report that such education has little or no 
effect on consumers’ actual financial decisions.60  And at least some of the studies 
that report favorable outcomes as a result of financial literacy education are subject 
to important methodological flaws, such as self-selection bias and data collection 
techniques that tend to be biased toward favorable outcomes.61 
But this does not mean that financial literacy education can never promote 
regulatory goals: Emerging evidence suggests that financial literacy education can 
indeed have a positive, albeit small, effect when provided immediately before a 
specific financial decision that individuals are motivated to make correctly.62  In-
deed, in some sense, a mandatory summary disclosure is a form of highly context-
specific consumer financial literacy education.  It should therefore not be surprising 
that financial literacy education, like disclosure, can produce positive results when 
it is provided to consumers at the appropriate time and is otherwise well de-
signed.  By contrast, most forms of financial literacy education fail to impact con-
sumer decisionmaking positively.  Often this is because, due to various cognitive 
constraints, individuals fail to link such education to specific transactions about 
which they are motivated.63 
3. Antifraud and Antideception Rules 
Transparency-based consumer financial protection regulation almost univer-
sally includes rules prohibiting firms and individuals from making false or mislead-
ing statements.  Thus, false and deceptive practices are prohibited in securities law,64 
  
60. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on 
Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 577–79 (2001); Lisa J. 
Servon & Robert Kaestner, Consumer Financial Literacy and the Impact of Online Banking on 
the Financial Behavior of Lower-Income Bank Customers, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 271 (2008).  
But see Jonathan Fox et al., Building the Case for Financial Education, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 
195 (2005). 
61. Willis, supra note 59, at 205–07 (describing these problems in detail). 
62. See Lewis Mandell & Linda Schmid Klein, Motivation and Financial Literacy, 16 FIN. 
SERVICES REV. 105 (2007) (finding that motivation of individuals significantly impacts the 
effectiveness of financial literacy education); Rutledge, supra note 50, at 2 (emphasizing that 
financial literacy should be provided at “teachable moments”). 
63. See Daniel Fernandes et al., Financial Literacy, Financial Education and Downstream Financial 
Behaviors, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333898. 
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  
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consumer credit law,65 and insurance law.66  The application of these rules to out-
right fraud is typically straightforward as a legal or regulatory matter.  By contrast, 
the impact of these rules on deceptive or misleading practices depends almost en-
tirely on how they are enforced.  That is because deception is a broad and mallea-
ble standard, and hence must be defined ex post via application of the standard to 
specific cases.67  The enforcement of these rules is typically most robust when indi-
viduals have a private cause of action to pursue claims of deception, as individuals 
often have better, or at least different, information than regulators about the exist-
ence of deceptive practices.68  But traditional regulatory enforcement of 
antideception rules can also contribute substantially to transparent markets by lim-
iting deceptive advertising and marketing. 
4. Structuring Markets and/or Products 
One of the most promising regulatory strategies for directly promoting im-
proved consumer decisionmaking is for regulators to structure markets or prod-
ucts to create clearer, and often more limited, choices for consumers.  Perhaps the 
most salient examples of this approach are the health insurance exchanges that 
the Affordable Care Act requires to be operational in every state by 2014.69  These 
exchanges are regulated and centralized marketplaces wherein private firms sell 
their products to consumers according to prespecified rules designed to facilitate 
consumer choice. 
Available empirical evidence suggests that exchanges can be quite effective 
at promoting transparent markets.70  All exchanges have the important virtue of 
reducing consumer search costs by aggregating relevant information in a single 
place.  They also generally allow consumers to sort plans according to preferred 
features such as actuarial value, deductibles, copays, or whether a particular doctor 
is in network. 
Depending on how they are structured, exchanges can also promote market 
transparency through more aggressive strategies.  For instance, exchanges can 
  
65. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 753, 124 Stat. 1376, 1750 (2010).  
66. See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 880-1 (1997). 
67. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 591 (1992). 
68. See Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749, 771–
73 (2013). 
69. See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 139–41 (2011). 
70. See generally Jon Kingsdale, Health Insurance Exchanges—Key Link in a Better-Value Chain, 
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147 (2010) (using Massachusetts’s Commonwealth Health 
Insurance Connector as an example to suggest that exchanges can successfully promote 
transparency).   
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provide a seal-of-approval function if only prescreened products are sold in the 
exchange.71  They can also require standardization of certain product features, 
which promotes comparison shopping by reducing the number of relevant varia-
bles a consumer must consider.72  Finally, exchanges can also function as auto-
mated “recommender systems” that match consumers with a small number of 
products on the basis of consumer-specified needs and preferences.73  This can 
have a dramatic impact by limiting consumers’ “consideration sets” to a limited 
number of options that are more likely to be appropriate for their needs.74 
Product standardization outside of an exchange is an alternative approach to 
promoting more transparent consumer markets.  For instance, Medigap insur-
ance policies must fit one of eleven specified benefit designs in regulations.75  
Product standardization can promote transparency by reducing reading costs for 
consumers: Rather than familiarizing themselves with numerous different prod-
uct types, consumers need learn only the basic details of a few different options.76  
This approach is most likely to be effective when the alternatives differ on a single 
dimension.77  Moreover, product standardization may facilitate learning from 
friends and family by creating a common set of choices. 
A less intrusive alternative to product standardization is to require firms to of-
fer a standardized default product but to permit opt-out through affirmative con-
sumer action.  This approach may force firms to explain how any nonstandardized 
products they offer depart from the standardized option.78  Unfortunately, firms 
  
71. Id. 
72. See, e.g., Rosemarie Day & Pamela Nadash, New State Insurance Exchanges Should Follow the 
Example of Massachusetts by Simplifying Choices Among Health Plans, 31 HEALTH AFF. 982, 
982–85 (2012) (discussing how the Massachusetts exchange successfully promoted comparison 
shopping by standardizing products and limiting the number of health insurance options). 
73. See John Lynch, An Invitation to Research on Consumers’ Financial Decision Making (June 
6, 2010) (PowerPoint Presentation at the First Annual Boulder Summer Conference on 
Consumer Financial Decision Making), available at http://129.82.41.134/MPPCWorkshop/ 
Documents/WorkshopPresentations/Lynch%20Financial%20Decision%20Making.pdf. 
74. See Allan D. Shocker et al., Consideration Set Influences on Consumer Decision-Making and 
Choice: Issues, Models, and Suggestions, 2 MARKETING LETTERS 181, 188–92 (1991); see also 
Fernandes et al., supra note 63. 
75. See How to Compare Medigap Policies, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/ 
supplement-other-insurance/compare-medigap/compare-medigap.html (last visited Nov. 
21, 2013). 
76. See Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form 
Contracts, 167 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 30, 38–40 (2011). 
77. SUSAN E. WOODWARD, URBAN INST., A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES 
(2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411682_fha_mortgages.pdf (noting 
that encouraging comparison heightens competition and improves consumer outcomes only in 
markets in which the alternatives differ on a single dimension). 
78. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1989). 
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may be able to game certain legally required defaults by manipulating consumers to 
opt out of those defaults.79  One potential approach to ameliorating this risk is to 
afford greater legal protections to sales of default options than sales of nondefault 
options.80 
B. Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline 
A second broad category of transparency-based consumer financial protec-
tion, which can be labeled full disclosure, provides public access to a broad set of 
potentially relevant market and product information.  Such disclosure is generally 
provided through online tools.  Unlike the regulatory approaches described above, 
the primary audience for full disclosure is not (at least initially) ordinary consumers 
or retail investors.  Instead, the intended audience includes market intermediaries, 
consumer-oriented magazines, journalists, consumer advocates, academics, so-
phisticated consumers/investors, and government actors without direct access to 
the underlying information.81 
The most familiar, and elaborate, example of full disclosure is the federal se-
curities regime, which imposes exhaustive disclosure requirements on securities 
issuers.82  Doing so protects all investors, even though only a small handful actu-
ally read these disclosures.83  The core reason is that most securities are actively 
  
79. See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1220 (2013). 
80. See MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL 
SERVICES REGULATION 7–11 (2008) (suggesting that regulators require lenders to offer 
plain vanilla products, but also permit them to offer more complex products, though with less 
protection against judicial intrusion); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities 
Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 2028–35 (2010) (suggesting a “conform or explain” 
approach to retail investment products). 
81. See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1384–85 (2011). 
82. To be sure, many scholars dispute the need for so much mandatory disclosure in securities 
regulation.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1984); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: 
Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 
421 (2003) (“Critics of mandatory disclosure argue that a company will voluntarily disclose 
information that investors demand in order to reduce its cost of capital and avoid any 
discount that the market might apply to the company’s stock price if investors think that they 
have too little information to evaluate the company and its securities properly or, worse yet, if 
investors think that the company is hiding something.”). 
83. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723–37, 751–53 (1984) (suggesting that mandatory disclosure is 
a strategy for making efficient use of securities analysts and market professionals); Zohar 
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 
711, 781–82 (2006) (arguing that securities regulation, the role of which is to facilitate and 
maintain a competitive market for traders, benefits from mandatory disclosures because 
disclosures reduce costs and increase market competition). 
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sold on secondary markets, allowing prices to fluctuate according to new infor-
mation that is traded on by sophisticated actors.  Thus, even uninformed inves-
tors can be assured that securities prices are reasonably reflective of their actual 
worth. 
Full disclosure, however, can be an important and effective consumer pro-
tection strategy even in contexts in which no secondary market exists.  First, full 
disclosure can allow entrepreneurial market intermediaries or others, such as reg-
ulators, to design their own smart disclosure systems.84  Such systems translate 
available raw data into tailored disclosures for consumers through mobile apps 
and internet sites.85  These privately designed consumer information tools are 
particularly promising because they are mediated by market forces, thus ensuring 
a more nimble, evolving, and sophisticated approach to communicating useful 
information to consumers according to their particular needs and preferences.  
For these reasons, policymakers have proposed or actively implemented smart 
disclosure in a wide variety of settings, ranging from GPS information to 401(k) 
plans to credit cards contracts.86  But the key ingredient in empowering entrepre-
neurial market intermediaries to design smart disclosure tools is data.  Without 
standardized, easily available data, the costs to intermediaries of collecting and 
analyzing consumer products, use patterns, and practices can be prohibitive.87 
Second, full disclosure can increase market discipline even in the absence of 
smart disclosure by facilitating the efforts of market intermediaries and consumer 
watchdogs to independently assess product quality and appropriateness and make 
recommendations accordingly.88  This effect may have been significantly en-
  
84. See, e.g., COMM. ON TECH., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE TASK FORCE 
ON SMART DISCLOSURE: INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/tfsd_charter_signed.pdf. 
85. See id. 
86. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 95–96, 145–46 (2008); Memorandum from 
Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Informing Consumers Through Smart Disclosure 3–4 (Sept. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/ 
informing-consumers-through-smart-disclosure.pdf. 
87. See Thaler & Tucker, supra note 37, at 9.  
88. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 cmt. e, at 
133 (2009) (“Transferors will also be mindful of watchdog groups that can easily access the 
standard form and can spread the word about the use of unsavory terms.”); Ronald Chen & 
Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate 
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2004) (“Consumer-oriented groups, such as the 
Consumers Union, act as informers and watchdogs on behalf of consumers.”); William M. 
Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1701, 1737 (1999) (noting that full disclosure allows market intermediaries to “locate 
information relevant to parties they represent, analyze and distill it, and communicate it fairly 
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hanced in recent years by social media, which decreases the costs to market in-
termediaries of communicating with consumers and increases the capacity of 
consumers to communicate with one another.89  Indeed, the mere threat of these 
effects may have a substantial disciplining effect on firms, deterring them from 
imposing new fees or hidden unfair terms. 
Although the capacity of market intermediaries armed with full information 
to police private firms varies,90 there are numerous important recent examples of 
this process operating effectively.  For instance, the public availability of contracts 
has helped to prevent unfair or deceptive terms for software,91 cars,92 social media 
websites,93 and cell phones.94  The power of full disclosure extends to various oth-
er regulatory issues as well.  For example, when the Department of Labor made 
broad disclosures about 401(k) plans available online, a market intermediary used 
this information to rate different plans, which in turn generated decreased fees 
and enhanced competition.95  Similarly, full disclosure has proven effective in a 
broad range of environmental regulatory contexts.96  In campaign finance law, full 
  
and accessibly to individual consumers”).  Even Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, the 
most vocal critics of disclosure-based consumer protection, seem to admit the potential 
importance of this type of disclosure.  See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 732 
(“There are, to be sure, areas in which disclosures are aimed directly at sophisticated 
intermediaries, and where the presence of such intermediaries produces a desirable effect for 
the nonreading populous. . . . But these contexts are few and far between.”).  For one recent 
example of this phenomenon, consider Ian Ayres et al., Skeletons in the Database: An Early 
Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & 
Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 475, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2295157. 
89. See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1109–16, 1156. 
90. The effectiveness of full disclosure is not always clear.  For instance, some argue that 
performance disclosure requirements for credit rating agencies have failed to reward credit 
rating agencies with more accurate credit ratings.  See, e.g., Lynn Bai, The Performance 
Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS. 47, 69, 101–04 (2010). 
91. See, e.g., Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License Agreements, PC PITSTOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/ 
spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
92. See, e.g., David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 133, 164 n.73 (2010). 
93. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 89. 
94. See, e.g., Gilo & Porat, supra note 92, at 159, 164–67. 
95. See Thaler & Tucker, supra note 37, at 5. 
96. See generally Mark Stephan, Environmental Information Disclosure Programs: They Work, but 
Why?, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 190 (2002) (noting the beneficial role that information disclosure 
programs have played in environmental policy and discussing theories for how and why these 
programs are successful).  Perhaps the most well-known example is the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-To-Know Act, which required companies to publicly report the 
amounts of hazardous chemicals they released into the environment.  The result was a 
dramatic reduction in the release of toxic chemicals.  See Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing 
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disclosure is frequently credited with deterring corruption and promoting more 
effective enforcement of other types of election laws.97 
A third value of mandatory full disclosure is that it promotes regulatory ac-
countability.98  Market intermediaries with access to relevant data not only have 
the ability to convey information about product or service quality and appropri-
ateness to consumers but they also have the capacity to identify consumer protec-
tion problems in need of a regulatory solution.99  For instance, numerous studies 
using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data have helped to identify dis-
criminatory lending practices and prompted various initiatives to make credit 
more available in traditionally underserved areas.100  Similarly, a recent report by 
the Pew Health Group reviewed online credit card contracts in an effort to 
demonstrate that unfair terms were still common and to influence the implemen-
tation of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act 
(Credit CARD Act) in 2009.101  And in California, the public availability of 
  
About the Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVT’L L. 217, 218–20 (1996). 
97. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure 
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 295 (2005) (“Those who support more 
extensive campaign finance regulation usually favor disclosure as a necessary component that 
serves the traditional objective in candidate elections of combating corruption and also 
provides necessary information to voters in both candidate and issue elections.”). 
98. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-268, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: 
DATA ON APPLICATION AND COVERAGE DENIALS 2 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d11268.pdf. 
99. See Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some 
Evidence From Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 365 (Daniel Carpenter 
& David A. Moss eds., 2014) (noting that public interest groups are capable of influencing 
and scrutinizing regulatory measures through the media and public outreach). 
100. See, e.g., DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
LOST GROUND, 2011: DISPARITIES IN MORTGAGE LENDING AND FORECLOSURES 31 
(2011) (finding that “low-income and minority borrowers and neighborhoods have been 
disproportionately impacted by foreclosures and that this reflects the higher incidence of 
higher-risk products received by these groups”); Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial 
Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 644–46 (2010) 
(finding a higher number and rate of foreclosures in metropolitan areas where there is a large 
degree of Hispanic and especially black segregation); Andrew Haughwout et al., Subprime 
Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing, 
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF., 2009, at 33, 33–35; Gregory D. Squires et 
al., Segregation and the Subprime Lending Crisis 2–4 (Apr. 16, 2009) (Presented at the 2009 
Federal Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference), available at http:// 
www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/events/community/2009carc/Hyra.pdf (concluding that racial 
segregation, especially among African Americans, is a significant predictor of metropolitan-
level variation in the proportion of subprime lending). 
101. See PEW HEALTH GRP., STILL WAITING: “UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE” CREDIT CARD 
PRACTICES CONTINUE AS AMERICANS WAIT FOR NEW REFORMS TO TAKE EFFECT (2009), 
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health insurers’ claims denial data allowed the California Nurses’ Association to 
call attention to the fact that the state’s six largest insurers rejected nearly one out 
of every five claims they received during the first half of 2009.102  This effort, in 
turn, prompted the state attorney general to open an investigation into the claims 
payment practices of the state’s largest insurers.103 
To be sure, market intermediaries may be able to facilitate smart disclosure or 
promote market and regulatory discipline even in the absence of full disclosure 
by conducting independent studies or surveys.104  But this is often not possible, as 
it may be quite costly for market watchdogs to obtain the information necessary 
to conduct such work.  Indeed, information revealing potential market problems 
will often be difficult to come by precisely because firms will tend to avoid making 
such information easily accessible.105  Simply reducing the cost of gathering in-
formation by standardizing its format and availability can have dramatic effects 
on the capacity of intermediaries to make use of that information.106  In any 
event, public access to market information and data is generally most efficiently 
facilitated by a single regulatory body, which can specify the format, content, and 
location of this data. 
II. INADEQUACY OF TRANSPARENCY REGULATION IN 
PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE 
Despite the ubiquity of transparency-oriented regulation in most consumer 
protection domains, such regulation is surprisingly absent or lackluster in state in-
surance regulation.  In order to substantiate this claim, this Part focuses on five 
central regulatory issues in property/casualty insurance markets: (1) prompt and 
  
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Credit_Cards/Pew_Credit_ 
Cards_Oct09_Final.pdf. 
102. Press Release, Cal. Nurses Ass’n/Nat’l Nurses Organizing Comm., California’s Real Death Panels: 
Insurers Deny 21% of Claims (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/ 
02/idUS202570+02-Sep-2009+PRN20090902.  Recently, Vermont passed a similar law 
making claims denial information more available to the public.  This, in turn, prompted 
media attention to disparities in claims denial rates of different carriers.  See Andrew Stein, 
New Disclosures Show MVP Denied 15.5 Percent of Patient Claims in 2012; Blue Cross Denied 
7.6 Percent, VTDIGGER.ORG (Mar. 20, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://vtdigger.org/2013/03/20/ 
new-disclosures-show-mvp-denied-15-5-percent-of-patient-claims-in-2012-blue-cross-
denied-7-6-percent. 
103. Lisa Girion, HMO Claims-Rejection Rates Triggers State Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/04/business/fi-insure4. 
104. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 731–33. 
105. See Schwarcz, supra note 7. 
106. See Thaler & Tucker, supra note 37, at 55 (describing how simply making available online 
details of 401(k) plans empowered one intermediary, Brightscope, to increase its rating 
efforts substantially, with dramatic impacts on 401(k) providers more generally). 
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accurate payment of claims, (2) coverage that is consistent with consumers’ rea-
sonable expectations, (3) availability of insurance products for low-income and 
minority populations, (4) objectivity of independent insurance agents, and (5) af-
fordability of coverage.  In each case, state insurance regulation either completely 
forgoes transparency-oriented regulatory tools or relies on clearly inadequate 
transparency-oriented rules.  And, in each case, relatively simple transparency-
focused reforms could substantially improve regulation designed to address the 
underlying concern.  This Part also demonstrates that other spheres of financial 
regulation have in recent years adopted effective and targeted transparency-
oriented strategies when faced with analogous problems.  In advancing this final 
claim, this Part looks to consumer banking products—particularly mortgages, 
credit cards, and student loans—which raise some similar regulatory issues to 
property/casualty insurance.  It also uses federal regulation of health insurance 
markets as a foil, demonstrating the remarkable disconnect between this federally 
dominated form of insurance regulation and the state-based regulation of proper-
ty/casualty insurance. 
A. Full Disclosure of Claims Payment Practices 
One of the fundamental risks of property/casualty insurance is the prospect 
of insurer opportunism in claims payment.  This risk arises because policyholders 
perform routinely by paying premiums, whereas the insurer performs by paying a 
claim if, and only if, a covered loss occurs.107  As a result, an insurer may be able to 
retain premium payments even though it adopts an excessively aggressive stance 
on paying claims, particularly when they are very large.  Moreover, the complexity 
and abstractness of typical property/casualty insurance policies means that it is of-
ten unclear whether a loss is indeed covered.108  Consequently, policyholders may 
be unable to identify excessively restrictive claims practices even when they occur.  
Insurers who are inclined to take advantage of these facts can deny or delay pay-
ment knowing that policyholders may fail to challenge coverage denials or may be 
eager to settle because they have an immediate need for funds.109 
For these reasons, protecting insurance consumers from unfair or delayed 
claims resolutions is a central goal of insurance law and regulation.  Every state 
  
107. See, e.g., Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in Order to Avoid 
Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 578–
88 (1999). 
108. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 174, 180–81 (1986). 
109. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British 
and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735 (2009). 
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has enacted broad laws protecting consumers from opportunistic claims han-
dling, typically using the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’s 
(NAIC)110 Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act as a template.111  Preventing 
insurers from unreasonably refusing to pay or delaying claims payments is also a 
central concern of various insurance law doctrines, particularly rules governing 
bad faith.112 
Despite the importance of ensuring prompt and accurate claims payment in 
property/casualty insurance, state insurance law does not make publicly available, 
much less require disclosure to consumers of, any insurer-specific information re-
garding insurers’ claims-paying reliability or promptness.  This is true even 
though the vast majority of states currently collect data from individual automo-
bile and homeowners insurers regarding their claims payment practices through 
the Market Conduct Annual Statement (MCAS).113  These data elements in-
clude how often claims are paid within specified time periods, how often claims 
are denied, and how often policyholders sue for coverage.114  The NAIC aggre-
gates and stores this data, maintaining and updating standardized definitions for 
individual data elements. 
The public unavailability of this or similar data is largely attributable to in-
dustry resistance.  In 2008, the Market Conduct and Consumer Affairs Commit-
tee of the NAIC proposed publicly disclosing some of this data.115  Organizing 
through numerous trade groups, the industry successfully undermined the pro-
posal through a massive lobbying campaign.116  Its primary argument was that the 
  
110. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is a voluntary association of 
state insurance regulators that wields tremendous influence in insurance regulation through 
various mechanisms, including the drafting of model laws and regulations.  See Susan 
Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629–34, 667–69 (1999). 
111. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 900-1 (1997), http://www. 
naic.org/store/free/MDL-900.pdf.  These laws are enforced through generalized market 
conduct examinations as well as targeted investigations prompted by market conduct data or 
consumer complaints.  See generally KATHLEEN HEALD ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE 
INSURANCE REGULATION 103 (1995) (discussing private regulation of claims activities). 
112. See Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 
405 (1996). 
113. See Market Conduct Annual Statement Participating Jurisdictions, NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/industry_mcas_states (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
114. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MARKET CONDUCT ANNUAL STATEMENT: 
HOMEOWNERS (2011), http://www.naic.org/documents/industry_mcas_data_collection_2011_ 
homeowners.pdf. 
115. See NAIC MARKET REGULATION & CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMM., PROPOSAL FOR 
CENTRALIZED DATA COLLECTION (2008). 
116. See Chad Hemenway, NCOIL Study Expanded to Address NAIC Market Conduct Plan, 
BESTWIRE, July 11, 2008, available at http://annuitynews.com/Article/NCOIL-Study-
Expanded-to-Address-NAIC-Market-Conduct-Plan/96178; Letter from Am. Health Ins. 
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underlying data should be considered confidential because it could reveal proprie-
tary information.  Formal NAIC minutes regarding the issue indicate that the 
NAIC agreed to spend a year to “determine whether, and to what extent, the data 
collected would be confidential or be available to the public.”117  But since that 
time it has been assumed by virtually the entire regulatory community that 
MCAS data is confidential, and the issue has never, in fact, been revisited. 
Although the NAIC does not make available any insurer-specific market 
conduct data, it recently began publicly releasing aggregate industry MCAS data 
for individual states.  The data reveals that there are substantial variations among 
individual carriers with respect to various data elements.  For instance, in Ohio, 
the average homeowner carrier in 2009 closed approximately 21 percent of 
claims without payment.  But approximately 20 percent of the 150 reporting carri-
ers closed more than 30 percent of claims without payment, including four car-
riers that closed more than half of their policyholders’ claims without payment.118  
Similarly, in Kansas, approximately 19 percent of claims associated with private 
automobile insurance were not paid within sixty days of being reported.119  But 
for approximately 20 percent of the 120 reporting carriers, more than 30 percent 
of claims took more than sixty days to pay, with one carrier reporting that 80 per-
cent of its claims took more than sixty days to pay, and another carrier reporting 
that 60 percent of its claims fell within this category.  Unfortunately, consumers 
in these states have no ability to tell which insurers fall in which categories and 
thus cannot adjust their purchasing behavior accordingly. 
Consumer complaint information—the only information that state insur-
ance regulators make available to consumers that has any bearing on claims pay-
ing reliability—does very little to ameliorate these concerns.  Most states, as well 
as the NAIC, make consumer complaint information available on their websites, 
though insurers need not disclose this information directly to consumers.120  And 
  
Plans et al. to Sandy Praeger, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (May 27, 2008); see also 
Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insurance 
Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723, 734 (2009).  See generally James Connolly, NAIC Insurer 
Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, PROP. CASUALTY 360° (Sept. 25, 2008), http:// 
www.propertycasualty360.com/2008/09/25/naic-insurer-conduct-data-scheme-riles-insurers 
(stating “[i]ndustry representatives from major insurance trade groups . . . slammed the vote”). 
117. Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Joint Executive Committee, Plenary, 2008 NAIC PROC. 3RD 
QTR., 3–1, 3–8 (Sept. 22, 2008). 
118. OHIO DEP’T OF INS., MARKET CONDUCT ANNUAL STATEMENT—HOMEOWNER 
DATA (2009), http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Company/MC/2010/HOrc3.pdf. 
119. KAN. INS. DEP’T, 2009 PROPERTY & CASUALTY MARKET CONDUCT ANNUAL STATEMENT 1 
(on file with author). 
120. According to a 2010 resources report, only six states do not make this data publicly available.  
This data is collected by individual states and then reported and aggregated by the NAIC, which 
maintains an online tool allowing users to view various complaint ratios for individual carriers.  See 
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the majority of such complaints do indeed concern claims handling.121  This data, 
however, is generally limited and inconsistent.  Most aggrieved consumers never 
complain to their state’s insurance department.  And the rate at which consumers 
do complain is based on numerous factors, including the willingness of compa-
nies to direct unsatisfied consumers to state insurance departments or the average 
affluence of policyholders, which tends to correlate with willingness to com-
plain.122  MCAS claims data are not subject to any of these limitations, though 
they of course have their own limitations.123 
Even apart from the limitations in the underlying data, state regulators cur-
rently report consumer complaint data in a manner that substantially limits its 
meaning.  First, consumer complaints in many states and at the NAIC are re-
ported only if the state insurance regulator confirms them.124  Among all com-
plaints reported to the NAIC, approximately 73 percent are not confirmed and 
thus never publicly reported.125  Second, and even more importantly, consumer 
complaints are reported by individual insurance companies rather than by the in-
surance groups with which consumers are familiar, such as Allstate and State 
Farm.126  As a result, a consumer interested in the complaint ratio for a specific 
insurance group, such as Allstate, would be directed to potentially dozens of dif-
ferent insurance companies, all of which have different complaint numbers.  Un-
less the searcher (1) was already a policyholder and had been assigned a specific 
insurance company, and (2) understood the distinction between insurance groups 
and companies, this information would prove almost impossible to decipher. 
  
Consumer Information Source, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, https://eapps.naic.org/cis (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
121. Schwarcz, supra note 109, at 751. 
122. See, e.g., J.P. Liefeld et al., Demographic Characteristics of Canadian Consumer Complainers, 9 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 73 (1975); Joseph Barry Mason & Samuel H. Himes, Jr., An Exploratory 
Behavioral and Socio-Economic Profile of Consumer Action About Dissatisfaction With Selected 
Household Appliances, 7 J. CONSUMER AFF. 121 (1973).  
123. Market Conduct Annual Statement (MCAS) data are evidently reliable enough that 
regulators use them to guide their market conduct priorities.  But no data are perfect; 
insurance regulators would indeed be well served by collecting better and more fine-grained 
data.  In particular, state insurance regulators should move towards collecting transaction-
level data, of insurance transactions rather than summary data such as the MCAS.   
124. See, e.g., REASONS WHY CLOSED CONFIRMED CONSUMER COMPLAINTS WERE 
REPORTED AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 (2013), available at https://eapps.naic.org/ 
documents/cis_aggregate_complaints_by_reason_codes.pdf. 
125. In using complaint information to identify market problems, regulators themselves look at 
both total complaints and confirmed complaints.  See 1 NAIC, MARKET REGULATION 
HANDBOOK 25–27 (2009). 
126. Each insurance group typically has numerous insurance companies, each licensed to do 
business in a different state.  Even within a state, an insurance group may have multiple 
insurance companies (for example, Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate Insurance Company, and 
Allstate Property and Casualty Company). 
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These deficiencies in consumer complaint information become even more 
apparent when contrasted with analogous federal regulatory efforts.  First, con-
sider the regulation of claims payment data in the federally regulated health in-
surance sphere.  As with property/casualty insurance regulation, the vast majority 
of states did not make publicly available health insurers’ claims payment rates be-
fore the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).127  But even before 
the ACA, quasiregulatory bodies with a federal reach, such as the American 
Medical Association (AMA), published information on the timeliness, transpar-
ency, and accuracy of claims processing by the nation’s largest health insurance 
companies.128  Given the obvious limitations of relying on such quasiregulation, 
the ACA will make such disclosure a formal regulatory requirement in 2014.129  
This data on carriers’ claims payments must be provided in plain language that 
consumers can readily understand and use.130 
Similarly, the CFPB’s database on consumer complaints for credit cards re-
veals the inadequacies of state consumer complaint reporting in property/casualty 
insurance.131  In that database, consumer complaint information is reported by 
the brand names of credit card companies, rather than by company subsidiaries or 
product types.  Moreover, the CFPB includes complaints in the database regardless 
of whether they are considered “confirmed,” leaving it to the “marketplace of ideas” 
to determine what the data show.132  As the CFPB notes, “[s]o long as consumers 
are aware of the limitations of the data, there is little or no reason to believe that 
complaint data should make the market less informed and transparent.”133  Shortly 
after the CFPB launched this database, various media outlets reported on it, noting 
  
127. California has collected data on health-insurer claims denials since 2002.  See CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 1367.03(f)(2) (West 2008).  In 2010, the Connecticut legislature 
approved a bill mandating the reporting of certain health-insurance claims denial data.  See 
2010 Conn. Acts 170–73 (Reg. Sess.). 
128. National Health Insurer Report Card, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ 
advocacy/topics/administrative-simplification-initiatives/national-health-insurer-report-card.page? 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
129. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) will also require insurers participating in 
state insurance exchanges to publicly disclose “[c]laims payment policies and practices[,] . . . 
[d]ata on the number of claims that are denied[,] . . . [and] [o]ther information as determined 
appropriate by the Secretary.”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18031(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 2011). 
130. Id. § 18031(3)(e)(B). 
131. Credit Card Complaints, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://data.consumerfinance 
.gov/dataset/Credit-Card-Complaints/25ei-6bcr (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
132. The CFBP does, however, maintain significant controls to authenticate complaints.  See Disclosure of 
Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558, 37,561–62 (June 22, 2012). 
133. See id. at 37,562. 
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that Capital One had the highest number of consumer complaints.134  More re-
cently, an academic analysis used this database to identify specific banks that “were 
significantly less timely in responding to consumer complaints than the average fi-
nancial institution,” “were significantly more likely than average to dispute the 
company‘s response to their initial complaints,” and “received more mortgage com-
plaints relative to mortgages sold than other banks.”135 
If insurance regulators invested time and resources in publicly releasing 
quality, carrier-specific data regarding different carriers’ claims payment practic-
es, their regulatory efforts would be much more efficient and effective.  Currently, 
the only publicly available information about carriers’ claims-paying practices 
comes from personal anecdotes and highly imperfect consumer surveys.136  The 
public release of detailed and specific MCAS data, by contrast, would dramati-
cally alter this landscape.  Such full disclosure would empower market watchdogs 
to communicate more accurately to consumers the quality of different carriers’ 
claims practices.137  Full disclosure could also improve the capacity of independ-
ent insurance agents, consumer magazines, and market intermediaries using 
smart disclosure to more accurately direct consumers to carriers according to the 
consumer’s desired mix of claims service and price.138  Further, the mere threat of 
these forces could well alter insurers’ calculus of how best to pay claims. 
Importantly, all these potential benefits would complement current regula-
tory and judicial efforts to prevent unfair claims practices.  But rather than simply 
relying on occasional bad-faith cases and vastly overstretched state regulators for 
enforcement of these efforts, this approach would harness market forces to induce 
carriers to do a better job of paying claims fairly and promptly.139  Moreover, un-
  
134. Alwyn Scott & Rick Rothacker, Consumer Bureau Discloses Credit-Card Complaints, CHI. 
TRIB., June 19, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-19/business/sns-rt-us-
usa-creditcards-complaintsbre85j03w-20120619_1_credit-card-complaints-complaint-
database-consumer-bureau (“‘Making credit card complaints public will put added pressure 
on banks to avoid unfair practices and help consumers make more informed financial 
decisions,’ said Pamela Banks, senior policy counsel for Consumers Union, in a statement.”). 
135. For one recent example of this phenomenon, consider Ayres et al., supra note 88. 
136. See id.; see also Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of 
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007).  Some, but not all, states do make 
market-conduct exams of particular companies publicly available.  But accessing these reports 
is quite difficult, as there is no centralized location for these reports.  More importantly, a 
substantial number of market conduct reports are not released because they are sealed 
pursuant to settlement between regulators and companies.  This means that the exams that 
are released represent a biased and incomplete sample.  Schwarcz, supra. 
137. See supra Part I.B, Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline. 
138. Schwarcz, supra note 116. 
139. Cf. Tom Baker, Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395 
(1994) (arguing “insurance companies tell stories about insurance that courts can use (and 
implicitly have used) as a source for the ‘unwritten’ obligations of the insurance relationship”). 
420 61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014) 
 
 
like either judicial or regulatory scrutiny, this approach could facilitate consumer 
choice about the tradeoff between premiums and claims handling quality.  Final-
ly, it could generate pressure on regulators to better police outlier carriers who 
adopt particularly aggressive claims-handling practices.140 
B. Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations 
1. Improving Consumer Understanding of Coverage  
A core concern of insurance law and regulation is that consumers’ actual cov-
erage matches their reasonable expectations of that coverage.  On the regulatory 
side, states require that carriers’ policies comply with various specific coverage man-
dates.  They also typically require that carriers’ policies not be “unfair, ambiguous, 
unreasonable, or contrary to public policy.”141  In most states, enforcement of these 
rules in personal lines of coverage occurs through “prior approval” form review, 
meaning that the relevant insurance regulator must specifically approve carriers’ 
policy documents before they are used in the market place.142  Judicial doctrines also 
serve to promote consumers’ reasonable expectations of coverage.  Indeed, one of 
the most controversial doctrines of insurance law is specifically designed to validate 
consumers’ objectively reasonable expectations of coverage notwithstanding policy 
language tending to negate those expectations.143 
Despite the importance of ensuring that coverage matches consumers’ rea-
sonable expectations, state insurance law and regulation does remarkably little to 
promote consumers’ understanding of coverage.  Perhaps most strikingly, no state 
requires any type of summary disclosure regarding the terms of coverage to be de-
livered to consumers before, or at the time of, purchase.  And only a small minority 
of states require summary disclosure of policy terms at the time of policy delivery, 
which is usually two-to-three weeks after purchase.144  NAIC model rules or laws 
also do not require any form of summary coverage disclosure.145 
  
140. See Schwarcz, supra note 109. 
141. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1276. 
142. See Stephen P. D’Arcy, Insurance Price Deregulation: The Illinois Experience, in DEREGULATING 
PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING 
MARKET EFFICIENCY, supra note 17, at 248, 256–58. 
143. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 967 (1970).  The dominant interpretive meme of insurance law—the ambiguity rule—can 
also be justified at least in part as a mechanism to promote consumers’ reasonable expectations of 
coverage.  Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
531, 547–50 (1996). 
144. Several states require insurers to disclose at the time of policy delivery (which is several weeks after 
purchase) that the policy contains certain exclusions, such as for damages caused by flood or 
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Instead, in the vast majority of states, the only description of coverage that 
insurers must provide to consumers is the insurance contract itself, which is typi-
cally a twenty- to forty-page document that includes various amendatory en-
dorsements.  To be sure, most states do require policies to meet a specific 
quantitative readability score, usually a fifty or forty on the Flesch-Kincaid Read-
ing Ease Score.146  Additionally, they often require that the policies contain a ta-
ble of contents and “self-contained and independent” sections, be written in no 
less than ten point font, and “use everyday, conversational language.”147 
But these rules are inadequate at promoting real consumer understanding of 
policy coverage.  First, providing consumers with information several weeks after 
purchase—whether through a policy document itself or through a summary dis-
closure—will not promote the regulatory goal of ensuring coverage that consum-
ers reasonably expect because consumers do not receive the relevant information 
when they actually need it.148  Consumers have virtually no incentive to read these 
documents once they have already settled on an insurance carrier and policy, par-
  
earthquake.  See 702 DEL. CODE REGS. § 5 (LexisNexis 2013) (flood); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:1-
5.5 (2013) (flood); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3444 (McKinney 2007) (mudslide or flood).  In Colorado, 
insurers issuing dwelling fire insurance, homeowners insurance, or auto insurance must have on file 
for public inspection a summary disclosure form that contains a simple explanation of the major 
coverages and exclusions of its policies, as well as a recitation of general factors considered in 
cancellation, nonrenewal, and increase in premium situations.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-111 
(2012).  Delaware also requires insurers to offer various other disclosures regarding matters such as 
replacement cost settlement, policy limits, and nonrenewal.  Alaska requires that if an auto insurance 
policy does not include mandated liability coverage, the insurer must disclose that fact in boldface 
type at the time of policy delivery.  ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.465 (2012).  Several states mandate some 
summary disclosures pertaining to rental car insurance.  For instance, in Kentucky, rental vehicle 
insurance may not be sold unless certain disclosures are made in writing and included with the rental 
vehicle agreement.  The disclosures must include a clear and concise description of the material terms 
and conditions of the coverage, including a description of exclusions and a statement that the 
coverage offered may be duplicative of coverage already provided by the renter’s personal automobile 
insurance policy.  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-509 (LexisNexis 2011).  In Maine, compre-
hensive personal auto insurance must cover rental vehicles, and that fact must be disclosed to 
consumers in a notice accompanying the policy at the time of issuance.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 24-A, § 2927 (West 2000).  Many states do require event disclosures whereby policy terms must 
be disclosed on the occurrence of a certain event, such as a policy claim. 
145. One exception applies when insurance is sold through an employer or affinity group, 
something that is very uncommon in the property/casualty context.  NAIC MODEL LAWS, 
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 710-2, § 10 (1997). 
146. See Public Hearing on Insurance Contract Readability Standards Before the NAIC 
Consumer Connections Working Group for the Public Hearing on Insurance Contract 
Readability Standards (Mar. 2010) (testimony of Brenda Cude, Prof. of Hous. & Consumer 
Econ., Univ. of Ga.) (on file with author). 
147. See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 732-1 (1997), available at 
http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-732.pdf. 
148. See supra Part I.A.1, Summary Disclosures (discussing the importance of timing disclosures 
correctly); see also Korobkin, supra note 42, at 1226; Schwarcz, supra note 109. 
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ticularly because switching carriers after purchase is difficult and costly.149  More-
over, many consumers may have trouble recalling and making use of the basic 
insurance knowledge and terminology they learned when making the initial pur-
chase several weeks earlier.150 
Using the insurance policy itself as a disclosure is also inconsistent with the 
other two best practices of disclosure described in Part I: (1) providing limited in-
formation and (2) using a uniform and tested template.  Even motivated consum-
ers are ill-equipped to comprehend the meaning of typical property/casualty 
policies, which are, in many ways, uniquely impenetrable.151  Flesch-Kincaid and 
other readability requirements do little to remedy this problem.  Not only are the 
required scores well above the reading level of most Americans, but these scores do 
not reflect the length of the underlying document, its organization or formatting, 
or the extent to which words are put together in logical and clear sentences.152 
These inadequacies are only partially mitigated by the various buyers’ guides 
and consumer advisories that regulators produce.  The NAIC maintains and 
makes publicly available an extensive array of consumer financial education on in-
surance, including buyers’ guides that describe coverage in generic terms and pro-
vide some useful background and helpful questions to ask insurance agents.153  
Unfortunately, these attempts at financial literacy education suffer from two seri-
ous flaws, even apart from the more general inadequacies in consumer financial 
education.154  First, not only are these materials not provided “just in time”155 but 
most consumers never actually see them at all: Insurers and agents are not usually 
required to make these documents available to consumers in property/casualty 
markets, and they are instead buried in frequently hard-to-find links on state in-
  
149. See Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine?: The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 21 RAND 
J. ECON. 518 (1990). 
150. See supra Part I.A.2, Financial Literacy Education (discussing just-in-time financial education). 
151. See Schwarcz, supra note 7.  See generally Michelle E. Boardman, Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2006) (quoting a recent South Carolina 
Supreme Court decision as stating that “[a]mbiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the 
favorite tools of the insurance trade in drafting policies”). 
152. See Public Hearing on Insurance Contract Readability Standards Before the NAIC Consumer 
Connections Working Group for the Public Hearing on Insurance Contract Readability 
Standards, supra note 146 (testimony of Daniel Schwarcz, Brenda Cude, and Amy Bach). 
153. The NAIC also runs a website, “InsureU,” that aims to educate consumers about various 
insurance issues.  See INSUREU, http://www.insureuonline.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).  
In addition to these efforts, various states also maintain generic descriptions of different 
insurance lines of coverage on their websites and in informational brochures.   
154. See supra Part I.A.3, Antifraud and Antideception Rules. 
155. See supra Part I.A.3, Antifraud and Antideception Rules. 
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surance department websites.  Second, with remarkably few exceptions,156 these 
materials are completely generic: They provide consumers with absolutely no 
carrier- or consumer-specific guidance.  In many cases, consumers would be bet-
ter off simply Google searching the desired coverage line than reading the rele-
vant buyers’ guide. 
The collective inadequacy of these regulatory efforts is put into sharp relief 
when they are compared to federal efforts to inform consumers about the key 
terms of complex financial contracts.  For instance, consider the CFPB summary 
disclosure form for mortgages.157  This document is a three-page disclosure that 
is standardized across the industry in format, design, and information but that is 
personalized to the borrower’s particular loan.  The disclosure form provides the 
most important information on the first page, is written using simple and accessi-
ble words, and is given to consumers before they agree to the terms of a mort-
gage—at least three business days before closing on the loan.158  The CFPB has 
extensively tested the document itself with consumers through focus groups, con-
sumer surveys, and the broad solicitation of consumer feedback online.159 
Perhaps an even more compelling comparison that reveals the inadequacies 
of property/casualty disclosure rules is provided by the ACA’s disclosure regime 
for health insurance policies.  ACA requires the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), in consultation with the NAIC, to develop a uniform 
“summary of benefits and coverage” that would not exceed four pages, would uti-
lize uniform definitions, and would provide consumers with a broad description 
of key coverage terms, cost-sharing requirements, and exclusions.160  State regula-
tors, operating through the NAIC pursuant to a federal legislative command and 
needing to prove themselves to federal regulators, did an admirable job of devel-
  
156. The one exception is that one state, Texas, maintains a very good online tool that provides 
consumers with summary information regarding the content of individual carriers’ 
homeowners policies.  See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1334–35. 
157. A sample of the Loan Estimate disclosure form created by the CFPB is available at Loan Estimate, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_loan-
estimate.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).  See generally Disclosure Comparison, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/compare (last visit-
ed Nov. 22, 2013). 
158. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PROPOSED RULE TO SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE 
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE FORMS (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_ 
cfpb_consumer-summary_proposed-rule-to-improve-mortgage-disclosure.pdf (commenting 
on proposed disclosures). 
159. Kennedy et al., supra note 28. 
160. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15 (Supp. 2011) (adding Section 2715 to the Public Health Service Act). 
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oping such a document.161  State regulators subjected the document to extensive 
consumer testing and repeatedly refined it in response to the results of that test-
ing.162  As a result, it clearly communicates the central terms of a health-insurance 
policy in a standardized format with which consumers will become increasingly 
familiar and that will tend to facilitate comparison shopping and market discipline. 
State regulators could easily devise an analogous document for proper-
ty/casualty insurance policies.  The document would likely focus consumers’ at-
tention on key exclusions for which supplemental coverage could be purchased as 
well as on the coverage limit, which generally must be sufficient to rebuild in the 
event of a total loss.163  It would highlight whether claims are paid out according 
to actual cash value (ACV) or replacement.  And it might also focus consumers’ 
attention on exclusions that are intended to reduce moral hazard—the risk that 
policyholders will take insufficient care because they are insured.164  Additionally, 
an effective disclosure would convey, in summary form, a metric of the extent to 
which the underlying policy was more or less generous than the presumptive in-
dustry baseline, the relevant Insurance Services Office (ISO) policy.165  Except in 
the increasingly rare instances when consumers purchase coverage over the 
phone, insurers could easily provide this summary disclosure to consumers well 
before the purchase of the underlying coverage and maintain online access to the 
disclosure as well.166 
Such a summary disclosure form could (albeit imperfectly) promote cover-
age that is more consistent with consumers’ reasonable expectations if it were deliv-
ered to consumers before purchase and made widely available online.  It could 
encourage market discipline by penalizing firms that decrease coverage to consum-
ers in ways that their prices do not reflect.  It could also better match consumers 
with insurance providers by allowing consumers to select intelligently among avail-
able price/coverage combinations.  To be sure, how well such a document would 
  
161. The proposed template is available online.  Summary of Benefits and Coverage: What This Plan Covers 
& What It Costs, DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/correctedsbctemplate.pdf (last updated 
May 11, 2012). 
162. See CONSUMERS UNION, WHAT’S BEHIND THE DOOR: CONSUMERS’ DIFFICULTIES 
SELECTING HEALTH PLANS (2012), http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/pdf/Consumer% 
20Difficulties%20Selecting%20Health%20Plans%20Jan%202012.pdf. 
163. Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market Inefficiencies in the Purchase 
and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 345, 378–82 (2011). 
164. See Schwarcz, supra note 109. 
165. See id. 
166. The two dominant ways that consumers purchase coverage are over the Internet or in person, with 
an agent.  See MCKINSEY & CO., AGENTS OF THE FUTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY 
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE DISTRIBUTION 6 (2013).  In either case, there is simply no 
technical barrier to requiring that consumers receive relevant disclosure material before 
purchase.   
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accomplish these goals is an empirical question that would depend crucially on 
the quality of the disclosure.167  But, this approach could easily be paired with cur-
rent regulatory approaches to promote coverage consistent with consumers’ rea-
sonable expectations, such as coverage mandates and policy preapproval. 
Additionally, better disclosure of policy terms could yield benefits that are 
simply impossible to replicate through the traditional command-and-control ap-
proach to ensuring adequate coverage.  In particular, it could promote effective 
usage of insurance by consumers by limiting the risk of moral hazard: While 
many insurance contract exclusions are aimed at losses that are particularly likely 
to be the product of insufficient care, these provisions work only if policyholders 
are aware of them.168  If these clauses fail to reduce moral hazard risk and simply 
shift this risk to policyholders, they produce two independent social costs: They 
fail to minimize costs efficiently, and they allocate those costs to the comparative-
ly risk-averse party. 
2. Full Disclosure of Carriers’ Coverages 
Not only does state insurance regulation fail to promote effective summary 
disclosure to consumers, but it also fails to promote full disclosure to the public.169  
It is currently incredibly difficult for entrepreneurial intermediaries, motivated 
consumers, interested academics, consumer advocates, and inquiring news outlets 
to acquire copies of different property/casualty insurers’ policy documents.170  
Almost no insurers make these documents publicly available online.171  Nor do 
state insurance regulators systematically maintain copies of different carriers’ poli-
cies.  The copies states happen to have on file generally must be accessed either 
through a freedom-of-information request or by physically visiting the regulator, 
locating the relevant documents, and photocopying them.172  And even with re-
spect to the small handful of states that facilitate online access to regulatory fil-
  
167. See supra Part I.A, An Overview of Transparency-Oriented Consumer Financial Protection. 
168. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1308. 
169. See supra Part I.B, Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline (explaining the 
distinct value of full disclosure of information to the public). 
170. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1318–37 (emphasizing the various barriers to obtain-
ing policy forms). 
171. Id. at 1321 (“An information-seeking consumer might first look to insurers’ websites to 
access copies of policy forms.  A thorough review of these websites reveals that such an effort 
would be fruitless: not a single one of the top twenty homeowners insurers in the nation 
makes their homeowners policies available online.”).  Exceptions include California, Florida 
(property and casualty), Indiana (health and life), Pennsylvania, and Washington. 
172. See Elizabeth Abbott et al., Comments of NAIC Consumer Representatives Regarding Leveraging 
SERFF in Support of Public Access to Product Filings (2012) (on file with author). 
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ings, actually using these tools to retrieve available policy forms takes many hours 
of effort as well as substantial technical expertise.173 
Once again, these inadequacies contrast sharply with analogous efforts at 
transparency in the federal sphere.  For instance, the Credit CARD Act requires 
credit card issuers to publish on the Internet their cardholder contracts.174  These 
contracts are easily searchable on a single website that is specifically designed for 
ease of use.175  Similarly, the ACA requires that all health insurance policies be 
made publicly available on the Internet, along with information about a carrier’s 
list of network providers and drug formularies.176 
There is good reason to think that making insurance policies more widely 
available online would meaningfully improve market transparency.  In the United 
Kingdom, insurers’ policies are widely available online, usually through the insur-
er’s own website.177  Using this information, the primary consumer-oriented 
magazine in the United Kingdom ranks, each year, every insurance carrier based 
in part on a thorough analysis of the terms of each carrier’s insurance policy.178  It 
also has developed a standardized mechanism to inform consumers of each carri-
er’s terms, which discloses both the “[m]ost important policy elements” and, with 
a click of the mouse, various additional terms.179  Similarly, market intermediaries 
in Germany provide independent product ratings of different insurers’ policies.180  
C. Full Disclosure of the Availability of Insurance Products for Low-Income 
and Minority Populations 
A major regulatory goal in the homeowners insurance arena is to ensure the 
availability of coverage for low-income and minority populations.  The reason is 
  
173. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1325. 
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2012) (codifying § 204 of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act of 2009). 
175. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d). 
176. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1303, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 168 (2010). 
177. See, e.g., ECCLESIASTICAL, POLICY DOCUMENT: HOME INSURANCE (2013), http://www. 
ecclesiastical.com/Images/home%20insurance%20policy%20document.pdf; LEGAL & GEN., 
HOME INSURANCE: POLICY BOOKLET (2013), http://www.legalandgeneral.com/_resources/ 
pdfs/insurance/HomePolicy.pdf; Home Insurance Cover, HISCOX, http://www.hiscox.co.uk/ 
personal-and-home/home-insurance/details-of-cover (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
178. See Home Insurance: Which? Recommended Providers, WHICH?, http://www.which.co.uk/ 
money/insurance/reviews-ns/home-insurance/which-recommended-providers (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
179. See, e.g., Home Insurance Reviews—Hiscox Home Insurance Review, WHICH?, http://www. 
which.co.uk/money/insurance/reviews-ns/home-insurance-reviews/hiscox-home-insurance-
review (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
180. See Stephanie Meyr & Sharon Tennyson, Product Ratings as a Market Reaction to Deregulation: 
Evidence From Germany (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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simple: Homeowners insurance is a practical prerequisite for homeownership be-
cause lenders require that borrowers purchase and maintain coverage.  As one 
court succinctly put it: “No insurance, no loan; no loan, no house; lack of insur-
ance thus makes housing unavailable.”181  This concern gained substantial atten-
tion several decades ago when various insurers refused to sell coverage within 
“redlined” low-income and minority regions.182  Available evidence suggests that 
homeowners insurance continues to be systematically more expensive and less 
available in certain low-income, urban areas.183  Even in the absence of discrimi-
natory intent, facially neutral insurance practices producing these results may vio-
late the Fair Housing Act if a less discriminatory alternative is available.184 
According to a recent report, similar availability problems are common for 
automobile insurance.185  In particular, facially neutral rating criteria—including 
credit score, education, and occupation—systematically make comparable insur-
ance more expensive for low-income individuals than their wealthier coun-
terparts.  Moreover, coverage is often less available in low-income regions 
because of the absence of insurance agents.  And in some cases, carriers simply re-
fuse to sell coverage to low-income drivers in certain geographic regions.  These 
findings raise distinct problems: The unavailability of automobile insurance often 
means that low-income individuals cannot commute to work, locate new job op-
portunities, or easily acquire needed goods at affordable prices.186  Moreover, 
availability problems result in a more substantial population of uninsured drivers, 
which jeopardizes larger state goals of reasonable compensation for accident victims. 
  
181. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing 
Cartwright v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 880 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
182. See generally GREGORY SQUIRES, INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, 
AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1997). 
183. See generally Gregory D. Squires, Racial Profiling, Insurance Style: Insurance Redlining and the 
Uneven Development of Metropolitan Areas, 25 J. URB. AFF. 391 (2003).  But see Scott E. 
Harrington & Greg Niehaus, Race, Redlining, and Automobile Insurance Prices, 71 J. BUS. 439, 
456 (1998) (finding in Missouri that racial discrimination does not produce prices that are 
higher than expected claims costs in the context of automobile insurance). 
184. Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners 
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2006–13 (2006). 
185. Auto Insurers Charge High and Variable Rates for Minimum Coverage to Good Drivers From Moderate-
Income Areas, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (June 18, 2012), http://www.consumerfed.org/news/545. 
186. Cf. Steven Garasky et al., Transiting to Work: The Role of Private Transportation for Low-
Income Households, 40 J. CONSUMER AFF. 64, 74 (2006) (noting that low-income 
respondents are more likely to report that transportation problems affected training or labor 
force participation because of lapses in insurance); Brian D. Taylor & Paul M. Ong, Spatial 
Mismatch or Automobile Mismatch?: An Examination of Race, Residence and Commuting in U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas, 32 URB. STUD. 1453, 1471 (1995) (“That commuters dependent on 
public transit are at a distinct disadvantage in accessing employment, especially to dispersed 
suburban job sites, points to policies to help carless job-seekers get access to automobiles.”). 
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Despite these concerns, state insurance regulation has actively resisted mak-
ing publicly available any information regarding the availability and affordability 
of insurance in low-income and minority regions.  The last survey on point found 
that only four states require insurers to disclose any information regarding the 
availability of homeowners insurance in specific geographic regions, and no state 
makes publicly available geography-specific loss or pricing data for individual in-
surers.187  Similarly, the NAIC has no model laws or regulations requiring the 
collection and dissemination of such data, and it has repeatedly ignored advo-
cates’ efforts to promote such transparency.188  Systematic data is also lacking in 
the automobile insurance realm.  With the exception of a few states, particularly 
California, state laws and regulations do not require the collection or dissemina-
tion of data regarding the availability of automobile insurance to low income and 
minority populations.189 
Full disclosure about the extent of availability and affordability problems 
would likely increase regulator and carrier accountability for any coverage availa-
bility problems that do exist.  Currently, much of the evidence on these issues is 
anecdotal precisely because of the lack of relevant information.  Academics, pub-
lic interest groups, and journalists have been unable to document these problems 
systematically, allowing regulators, lawmakers, and carriers to avoid public pres-
sure to do anything about the underlying problems to the extent they exist in the 
first place.190  By contrast, in those states that do disclose information about the 
availability of coverage, public interest groups have had much more success in 
pressing carriers to expand the availability of coverage through Fair Housing Act 
lawsuits.191 
Federal efforts to promote transparency in analogous domains suggest the 
inadequacy of state insurance law and the potential benefits of a full disclosure re-
gime in insurance.  The HMDA requires most lenders to report and make pub-
licly available geocoded information regarding home loans, loan applications, 
interest rates, and the race, gender, and income of loan applicants.192  The 
  
187. Squires, supra note 183, at 404. 
188. See Gregory D. Squires, Bank Reform Offers Opportunity to Address Insurance Redlining, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2010, 12:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-d-
squires/bank-reform-offers-opport_b_644542.html. 
189. See Comments of the Consumer Federation of America and the Center for Economic Justice on 
Proposed Work Plan of Joint Auto Insurance (C/D) Study Group (July 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_d_auto_insurance_study_group_exposures_work_
plan_auto_study_group_cej_cfa_comments.pdf.  This might include data regarding average 
premiums, normalized for coverage differences, for geographic areas sorted by income level. 
190. See Squires, supra note 183, at 404. 
191. See id. 
192. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2012); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203 (2013). 
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HMDA has promoted a richer understanding of credit availability and discrimi-
nation, helped identify discriminatory lending practices, and prompted various 
initiatives to make credit more available in traditionally underserved areas.193 
In this instance, the inadequacy of state insurance regulation in promoting 
transparency proved sufficiently clear that federal lawmakers recently intervened.  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) establishes a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) and specifically charges 
it with “monitor[ing] the extent to which traditionally underserved communities 
and consumers, minorities . . . and low- and moderate-income persons have ac-
cess to affordable insurance products regarding all lines of insurance.”194  To do 
so, the FIO can “receive and collect data and information on and from the insur-
ance industry and insurers” and “analyze and disseminate [this] data and infor-
mation.”195  In other words, only after state insurance law repeatedly refused to 
make HMDA-like data for homeowners or automobile insurance publicly avail-
able did federal lawmakers step in and insist on this level of transparency, which 
has long been a core feature of federal housing policy. 
D. Improving Consumer Understanding of the Objectivity of Independent 
Insurance Agents 
Many property/casualty policyholders purchase their coverage through an 
independent insurance agent.  Such agents can write coverage with multiple dif-
ferent carriers, a fact that they claim allows them to better find a policy and com-
pany that matches consumers’ needs and preferences.196  But most independent 
insurance agents also receive different amounts of compensation for placing con-
sumers with different carriers.197  This can create a potential conflict of interest 
for agents, as they may earn more by steering a policyholder to an insurer that is 
not the best fit for that consumer.198 
  
193. See sources cited supra note 100.  Similarly, under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 
regulators’ assessments of banks’ and thrifts’ lending records to low- and moderate-income 
communities and the institutions’ CRA ratings are made public.  See Barr, supra note 23, at 601. 
194. 31 U.S.C. § 313(a), (c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2011). 
195. Id. § 313(e)(1)(A), (C). 
196. See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance 
Marketing System, 39 J.L. & ECON. 637, 642 (1996); Schwarcz, supra note 116. 
197. Often this is a result of “contingent commissions,” which are essentially year-end bonuses to 
agents based on the volume and/or profitability of the business sent to the insurer.  
Alternatively, some carriers may simply pay higher upfront “premium” commissions. 
198. See Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 291 (2007). 
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These issues have prompted substantial regulatory scrutiny in recent years.  
High-profile investigations by the New York Attorney General revealed that the 
leading commercial-insurance broker systematically steered its sophisticated cli-
ents to more expensive coverage, at times even orchestrating phony bids to do 
so.199  Not surprisingly, evidence suggests that similar steering (though not bid 
rigging) occurred at smaller independent insurance agencies as well.200  Insurance 
agent steering undermines market discipline by focusing insurers on wooing in-
surance agents rather than on providing value to consumers.201  It also under-
mines the matching of consumers with products that best suit their needs.202 
Despite these concerns, state insurance regulators have consistently refused 
to promote disclosure to consumers about the compensation and incentives of os-
tensibly independent insurance agents.  Most states do not currently have any 
rules or regulations regarding the disclosure of agent compensation.  Those that 
do typically do not require any such disclosure unless the agent received compen-
sation directly from the customer, which is highly atypical in most consumer 
transactions.203  Only a single state, New York, requires that agents in ordinary 
consumer transactions disclose before sale that their compensation may vary de-
pending on the carrier with which the consumer is placed.204  And this disclosure 
violates most of the basic principles for effective summary disclosure described 
above: It does not require disclosure in a standardized format or template, it was 
not consumer tested, it does not focus consumers on the key information, and it is 
likely to be drowned out by other disclosures.205 
  
199. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to Insurance Market 
Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3046–47 (2006). 
200. See Jeffrey M. Wilder, Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in 
Commercial Insurance 4–5 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Grp. 
Working Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=418061. 
201. Public Hearing on Producer Compensation: Hearing Before the N.Y. Ins. Dep’t & Office of the Att’y Gen. 
116 (July 25, 2008) (testimony of Don Bailey, CEO, Willis North America), available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/hearing/broker_comp_072008/br-cmp-tran-nyc.pdf (testifying that 
Willis, a property/casualty insurance broker, does not accept contingent commissions because 
they pose a “clear and obvious conflict of interest”). 
202. Schwarcz, supra note 198. 
203. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 3063–64. 
204. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 30.3 (2010).  Notably, this seemingly limited rule 
prompted massive outcry and resistance from the industry, including a lawsuit claiming that 
the rule was not within the Insurance Commissioner’s authority.  See In re Sullivan Fin. Grp., 
Inc. v. Wrynn, 939 N.Y.S.2d 761 (App. Div. 2012). 
205. See supra Part I, An Overview of Transparency-Oriented Consumer Financial Protection.  
The disclosure should focus consumers on the fact that differential compensation creates a 
conflict of interest for agents in recommending different carriers.  Additionally, agents should 
provide it when they cannot explain it away, and most importantly, such disclosure should be 
consumer tested. 
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Once again, this refusal of state regulators to embrace transparency contrasts 
starkly with federal regulation of analogous conflicts of interest.  For instance, un-
til the Dodd-Frank Act banned the payment of yield spread premiums to mort-
gage originators,206 federal law required U.S. mortgage brokers to disclose these 
payments, as well as all other forms of compensation, to borrowers within three 
days of the borrower’s initial application as well as at the time of closing.207  Like 
differential compensation to insurance agents, yield spread premiums created in-
centives for brokers to steer mortgage applicants to costly loans.208  Similarly, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires investment managers to disclose any 
side payments that they receive from brokerage firms in the form of “soft dol-
lars.”209  As above, these side payments create risks that investment managers will 
select brokerage firms that are not in their clients’ best interests.210 
To be sure, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of transparency-
based solutions to these types of regulatory problems, which Howell Jackson has 
labeled “trilateral dilemmas.”211  Indeed, federal disclosure efforts in this context 
have a poor record.  The disclosure-based approach to yield spread premiums 
seems to have been a failure, a fact implicitly recognized by the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
move to ban these payments.212  And the effectiveness of soft dollar disclosures is 
also unclear, with the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Mutual 
Fund Task Force having recommended “enhanced disclosure in fund prospectus-
es to foster better investor awareness of soft dollar practices.”213  Moreover, em-
pirical research suggests that disclosures of conflicts of interest can backfire, 
enhancing consumer trust of market intermediaries whom they credit with hon-
esty and forthrightness and increasing the willingness of intermediaries to act on 
their conflicts of interest.214 
  
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(4)(a) (2012). 
207. Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread 
Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 305–08 (2007). 
208. See Howell Jackson, The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation, in OVERCOMING THE 
SAVING SLUMP: HOW TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION 
AND SAVING PROGRAMS 82 (Annamaria Lusardi ed., 2008). 
209. See generally Lee B. Burgunder & Karl O. Hartmann, Soft Dollars and Section 28(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A 1985 Perspective, 24 AM. BUS. L.J. 139 (1986). 
210. See Schwarcz, supra note 198, at 313. 
211. See Schwarcz, supra note 116; Schwarcz, supra note 198. 
212. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(4)(a) (2012). 
213. MUT. FUND TASK FORCE, NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, REPORT OF THE MUTUAL 
FUND TASK FORCE: SOFT DOLLARS AND PORTFOLIO TRANSACTION COSTS 5 (2004) 
[hereinafter NASD TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/ 
industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p012356.pdf. 
214. See generally JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE 
EFFECT OF MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND 
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But in the absence of a complete ban on differential compensation to inde-
pendent insurance agents, various transparency-based approaches could indeed 
be partially effective.  Perhaps the most promising such approach would be for in-
surance regulators to use insurance-based antideception rules to forbid agents 
who receive differential compensation from describing themselves as independ-
ent.  That word, which is heavily emphasized in the marketing materials of most 
agents who place coverage with multiple carriers, conveys the impression that the 
agent will work solely in the policyholder’s best interests.  Differential compensa-
tion undermines this promise.  By forcing agents who accept differential com-
pensation to abandon their claims of independence, regulators could foster a 
market-based approach to differential compensation whereby agents seeking to 
appeal to consumers looking for genuine independence could disclaim differen-
tial compensation.215 
E. Affordable Insurance Rates and Improving Consumers’ Ability  
to Comparison Shop 
A major goal of state regulation of property/casualty insurance is to promote 
affordable insurance rates.  This goal, however, is quite controversial, with many 
commentators arguing that there is little risk that carriers will charge excessive 
rates in property/casualty markets because of market competition.216  This posi-
tion should be resisted for two reasons.  First, carriers’ actual coverage varies sub-
stantially in ways that are impossible for consumers to observe,217 and so the rate 
per unit of coverage that any carrier charges is also difficult for consumers to ob-
serve.  Second, even the nominal rate of coverage is quite costly for consumers to 
obtain: Unlike many products, the price that a carrier charges depends substan-
tially on the particularities of the policyholder.218  This means that insurers cannot 
  
COMPETITION: A CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT, at ES 1 (2004), available at http://www. 
mondomundi.alta.org/govt/issues/04/ftc_mtgebroker_0227.pdf; Daylian Cain et al., The 
Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
4–8 (2005). 
215. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 3067. 
216. See generally Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Rate Regulation of Auto Insurance, 
in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION 
AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY, supra note 17, at 285, 309–10; Harvey 
Rosenfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 69, 70 (1998). 
217. Schwarcz, supra note 116, at 734–37. 
218. Such risk-based pricing is also a feature of many credit products. 
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advertise a single price and that in order to obtain an accurate price quotation, 
consumers must engage in the time-consuming process of applying for coverage.219 
To address the perceived problem of excessive insurance rates, most states 
maintain an extensive program of rate review.  Some states require that all carriers 
receive preapproval from the insurance department before they change their rates, 
others review carriers’ rate changes after they are implemented, and some states 
do not affirmatively review premium rates at all.220  In addition to being quite 
costly, there is substantial evidence that, in many markets, this regulation can 
have unintended negative consequences, such as intensifying rate volatility and 
discouraging carriers from decreasing their rates.221  There is even evidence that it 
does not, in fact, result in the suppression of rates over the long run.222 
Although state insurance regulation devotes massive resources to directly 
regulating insurance rates, it does virtually nothing to leverage transparency-
oriented tools to address the perceived risk of excessive rates.  Perhaps the best 
way states could address affordability problems using transparency would be to 
structure insurance products to facilitate consumer comparison shopping.223  This 
would eliminate the difficulty consumers currently face in comparing coverage 
and rates on an apples-to-apples basis.  Indeed, the federal government insisted 
on this approach with respect to the sale of Medigap policies.224  Available evi-
dence suggests that this approach successfully promoted reduced insurance pric-
es.225  Admittedly, this strategy limits consumer choice, though it is arguably less 
intrusive than the aggressive rate regulation currently deployed in most states.  In 
  
219. Such risk-based pricing may allow carriers to discriminate in the prices they charge to 
different customers, charging more to consumers who tend not to comparison shop, such as 
long-time policyholders.  See OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNCIL, NOT SHOPPING FOR 
INSURANCE CAN LEAD TO OVERCHARGES, http://www.opic.state.tx.us/images/Final_ 
Failure_to_Shop_Report_-_7_26_12ENGLISH.pdf. 
220. See generally Cummins, supra note 17. 
221. See SHARON TENNYSON, NETWORKS FIN. INST., POLICY BRIEF NO. 2007-PB-03, 
EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES OF RATE REGULATION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 18 
(2007), available at http://indstate.edu/business/nfi/leadership/briefs/2007-PB-03_Tennyson.pdf.  
But see J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., STATE AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE REGULATION: A NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND IN-DEPTH 
REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SYSTEM (2008), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/state_auto_insura
nce_report.pdf (arguing that rate regulation has proven uniquely successful in California). 
222. See Harrington, supra note 216. 
223. See supra Part I.A.4, Structuring Markets and/or Products. 
224. See Thomas Rice & Kathleen Thomas, Evaluating the New Medigap Standardization 
Regulations, 11 HEALTH AFF. 194, 194 (1992). 
225. See, e.g., Lauren A. McCormack et al., Medigap Reform Legislation of 1990: Have the 
Objectives Been Met?, 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 157, 167–69 (1996); Thomas 
Rice et al., The Impact of Policy Standardization on the Medigap Market, 34 INQUIRY 106, 
113–14 (1997). 
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any event, states could adopt less aggressive versions of this approach, such as re-
quiring that all initial pricing of coverage take place on a standardized form but 
thereafter allowing carriers to offer their own personalized adjustments.226 
A second, less intrusive pricing-transparency strategy that states have ig-
nored is mimicking the ACA’s approach to facilitating price competition by 
promoting the use of insurance exchanges.227  Consumers who purchase health 
insurance on an exchange in 2014 will be able to comparison shop more easily 
among plans.228  Although the impact of the ACA on rates within the exchanges 
is a matter of some contention, initial indications suggest that exchanges are in-
deed helping to promote lower prices, particularly given various other elements of 
the ACA—such as increased coverage requirements and adverse selection—
which may push prices in the opposite direction.229  State lawmakers could estab-
lish similar regulated marketplaces to facilitate consumer comparison of proper-
ty/casualty policies.230  They could go even further by developing pricing 
measures, such as actuarial value, that embed within them presumed product-use 
patterns.  Similarly, they might embrace full disclosure of insurer product and 
pricing information to facilitate smart disclosure options that could recommend 
coverage tailored to individuals’ particularized preferences.231 
  
226. See supra Part I.A.4, Structuring Markets and/or Products. 
227. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 15–16 (2010), available at http://www. 
commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2010/Jul/Health-Insurance-
Exchanges-and-the-Affordable-Care-Act.aspx.  One way states could promote the develop-
ment of private insurance exchanges is by better regulating commercial websites that purport 
to provide consumers with multiple premium quotations but in fact operate as lead gen-
erators.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BEST PRACTICES FOR PREMIUM 
COMPARISON WEBSITES (2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_trans_ 
read_wg_exposures_best_practices.pdf.  State lawmakers could prohibit insurance companies 
from advertising or soliciting business on premium comparison websites unless they operate as 
advertised and generate immediate premium quotes from multiple carriers.  They could also 
require these sites to disclose the number of carriers from whom they offer quotes relative to the 
number of carriers in the marketplace, as well as information about commission levels that the site 
collects.  Alternatively, states could provide this type of premium comparison information directly 
to consumers in the form of a regulator-provided premium comparison guide.  But given the 
difficulties with keeping such a tool up to date and having it incorporate most rating factors, this 
approach is unlikely to be effective.  According to a recent survey of state insurance offices, only 
three states maintain this type of premium comparison tool.  See id. 
228. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking. 
229. See LAURA SKOPEK & RICHARD KRONICK, MARKET COMPETITION WORKS: SILVER PREMIUMS IN 
THE 2014 INDIVIDUAL MARKET ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN EXPECTED (2013), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/MarketCompetitionPremiums/ib_premiums_update.pdf. 
230. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking. 
231. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking, for a discussion 
of recommender systems. 
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An alternative transparency-oriented approach that state insurance law 
could borrow from the ACA would be to refocus states’ rate review process on 
communicating with consumers rather than restricting carrier rates.  The ACA 
directs HHS, in conjunction with the states, to identify unreasonable premium 
increases.232  But the ACA does not empower lawmakers to prohibit these rate 
increases; it instead requires the public posting of rate increases that are deemed 
unreasonable.233  This approach might inform consumers about which insurers 
are charging unreasonable rates while avoiding some of the pitfalls of more ag-
gressive rate review.234  According to HHS, initial results suggest that this pro-
gram has resulted in fewer dramatic increases in rates, though systematic evidence 
on this point is still not available.235 
Finally, state insurance regulators could consider improving the transparen-
cy of insurance pricing by requiring carriers to disclose the rating factors they use 
to determine pricing for individual policyholders and the relative weight they 
place on those factors.236  Doing this might allow consumers to narrow their 
searches to companies that are more likely to offer them affordable rates based on 
their unique characteristics.237  For instance, a consumer who drives many miles 
but maintains an excellent credit score could target companies that place high re-
liance on credit score and limited reliance on miles driven. 
  
232. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1003, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 
139–40 (2010). 
233. See id. 
234. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Review of Insurance Rates, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives 
/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/Review-of-Insurance-Rates.html (last visited Nov. 22, 
2013) (“The Affordable Care Act brings an unprecedented level of scrutiny and transparency 
to health insurance rate increases.”). 
235. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Law Saved an 
Estimated $2.1 Billion for Consumers (Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2012pres/09/20120911a.html; see also ROSE CHU & RICHARD KRONICK, 
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM INCREASES IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET SINCE THE 
PASSAGE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2013), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
health/reports/2013/rateincreaseindvmkt/rb.pdf.   
236. See Ctr. for Econ. Justice, Comments on Best Practices for Developing a Premium 
Comparison Guide (Feb. 22, 2011) (on file with author) (proposing such a disclosure and 
explaining in detail how it might work).  Currently, it is virtually impossible for consumers to 
get any sense of the rating factors that different companies use, much less the relative weight 
that different companies place on those factors.  See id. 
237. This disclosure would provide information on the weight of rating factors for policyholders as 
a whole.  This might allow consumers to narrow their search among the carriers most likely 
to offer them reasonable rates; it would not allow policyholders to determine definitively 
which carrier offered the lowest rates.   
436 61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014) 
 
 
III. ADEQUACY OF TRANSPARENCY REGULATION IN LIFE INSURANCE 
AND ANNUITIES 
As with property/casualty insurance, transparency-oriented consumer pro-
tection regulation is systematically and strikingly inadequate in the life/annuity 
insurance domains.  This Part demonstrates this claim with respect to four core 
regulatory issues in life/annuity markets: (1) solvency regulation, (2) guaranty 
fund protection, (3) annuity disclosures, and (4) price competition in cash-value 
life policies.  Moreover, it shows how financial regulators in other domains have 
consistently developed more robust and thoughtful mechanisms for promoting 
market transparency than have state insurance regulators.  Unlike in Part II, the 
primary, though not sole, point of comparison in this Part is federal securities law, 
which frequently raises many similar regulatory issues as life/annuity insurance 
markets, given that products in both domains aim to advance consumers’ savings 
and investment objectives. 
A. Solvency Regulation 
1. Full Disclosure 
The central goal of insurance regulation is to ensure that carriers have suffi-
cient financial resources to pay claims when they come due.238  This goal, howev-
er, is particularly important in the life/annuity insurance arena because of the 
long-term nature of these carriers’ obligations to policyholders.239  The tools that 
regulators deploy to achieve this goal fall under the heading of solvency regula-
tion, and they include risk-based capital requirements, reserve requirements, and 
investment restrictions.240  Despite the central importance of solvency regulation 
to insurance regulation generally, and life/annuity insurance in particular, this 
form of regulation employs remarkably few transparency-oriented tools. 
In fact, state insurance regulation affirmatively limits the availability of pub-
lic information about which insurers are in tenuous financial condition.  Indeed, 
about half of the states label it an “unfair trade practice” for anyone in the insur-
ance business to communicate any information that is “derogatory to the financial 
  
238. See EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND 
INSURANCE 106 (10th ed. 2008). 
239. See generally ANTHONY SAUNDERS & MARCIA MILLON CORNETT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
MANAGEMENT: A RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH (7th ed. 2011). 
240. See ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR’S INTRODUCTION TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
107–13, 140–67 (2d ed. 2005). 
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condition of an insurer,” even if that information is true.241  Similarly, many states 
prohibit anyone in the insurance business from communicating any information 
about the risk-based capital level of an insurer.242  Even the annual and quarterly 
financial accounting statements that insurers file with state regulators—which 
contain substantial amounts of data on the financial health of filing companies—
are only made publicly available for a fee, at least when more than a few state-
ments are downloaded.243 
To be sure, bank regulators similarly limit the availability of information re-
garding troubled banks.244  But in many ways banking rules are less extreme than 
insurance regulations.  For instance, bank holding companies’ quarterly perfor-
mance reports are publicly available, without cost, through the Federal Reserve’s 
National Information Center.245  Moreover, gag rules in banking are actually less 
extensive than they are in insurance: The only such rule involves disclosure by 
agencies and banks of safety and soundness examination reports and grades.246 
Even more importantly, though, the secrecy involved in the prudential 
regulation of banks does not justify comparable levels of secrecy in insurance 
regulation.  The primary reason for the secrecy that surrounds the financial con-
ditions of particular banks is that banks are uniquely susceptible to policyholder 
runs because a substantial amount of their liabilities are demand deposits that can 
be withdrawn in full at any time by policyholders for any reason.247  As such, neg-
ative financial information about a bank can actually substantially exacerbate that 
bank’s financial problems by triggering a bank run.248  Moreover, the vast majori-
ty of bank depositors can, and do, protect themselves from this risk by ensuring 
that their money is deposited in such a way that it is fully protected by Federal 
  
241. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-12-9 (LexisNexis 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-445 
(2002) (West); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816(3) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 
27-4-1-4 (LexisNexis 1999); see also Life Insurance: An Industry Built on Secrecy, 31 INS. F. 45, 
47–48 (2004). 
242. See Life Insurance: An Industry Built on Secrecy, supra note 241, at 48; see, e.g., NAIC MODEL 
LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 312-1 (2012), available at http://www.naic.org/ 
store/free/MDL-312.pdf. 
243. The NAIC projects it will earn $25.9 million in 2012 from database filing fees paid by the 
industry and another $18.9 million from sales of its insurance data products.  R.J. Lehmann, 
FIO, FOIA and a Free Market in Insurance Data, R ST. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://rstreet.org/ 
2011/10/27/fio-foia-and-a-free-market-in-insurance-data. 
244. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Regulation: The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987). 
245. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s): Financial Report Questions, FED. RES., http://www.ffiec.gov/ 
nicpubweb/content/help/NICFAQReport.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
246. See generally id. 
247. See Helen A. Garten, The Consumerization of Financial Regulation, 77 WASH. U. L. REV. 
287, 298 (1999). 
248. See id. 
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Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance.249  Most bank depositors 
consequently do not need information about their bank’s financial health in order 
to enjoy absolute security in their deposits. 
By contrast, life insurers are at much less risk of a policyholder run than are 
banks.  Many forms of life insurance and annuities do not permit policyholders to 
withdraw funds voluntarily.250  Those that do typically charge a substantial fee 
that limits the desirability of this option.251  Partially for these reasons, policy-
holders conceptualize life insurance products differently than bank accounts, con-
sidering them long-term investments rather than sources of instant liquidity.  
History bears these distinctions out: There has never been a run on the life insur-
ance industry writ large, despite occasional predictions of such runs in the popular 
press.252  And while there has once or twice been a “run” on an individual life in-
surer, this was only after it became clear that the insurer would not have been able 
to rehabilitate itself.253 
Additionally, it is much harder for insurance policyholders to protect them-
selves against solvency risk than it is for bank depositors to do so.  This is because 
FDIC insurance applies a separate limit to every account that an individual owns 
at different banks, allowing depositors with cash that exceeds the FDIC limit to 
simply open up accounts at multiple banks.254  By contrast, state guarantee 
funds—which provide policyholders with some measure of protection in the 
event that their insurer cannot meet its financial obligations255—provide only a 
single limit per individual that cannot be increased by spreading protection around 
  
249. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 1. 
250. See, e.g., Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, 
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: 
BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15, 23–24 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (“Insurance 
companies are not reliant on first-come, first-served demand liabilities, and so they are not 
vulnerable to a loss of confidence and subsequent pressures to liquidate assets rapidly in order 
to meet the demands of creditors.”). 
251. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 30–31 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that whole-life insurance policies include 
savings components from which money can be drawn at a designated interest rate). 
252. See Scott E. Harrington, Policyholder Runs, Life Insurance Company Failures, and Insurance 
Solvency Regulation, 15 REGULATION 27, 30 (1992). 
253. See generally Harry DeAngelo et al., The Collapse of First Executive Corporation Junk Bonds, 
Adverse Publicity, and the ‘Run on the Bank’ Phenomenon, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 287 (1994). 
254. See Deposit Insurance Summary, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/dis (last updated Oct. 
17, 2013). 
255. See Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance: Rationale and 
Design, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55, 90 
(Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009). 
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to multiple different companies.256  Additionally, unlike FDIC insurance, state 
guarantee funds are neither prefunded nor backed by the full faith and credit of the 
federal government.257 
For these reasons, securities law, rather than banking, provides a more ap-
propriate basis of comparison for evaluating the transparency of carriers’ financial 
health.  Viewed against this backdrop, the lack of transparency surrounding in-
surers’ solvency is striking.258  Transparency and disclosure are, of course, the core 
tools of securities law.259  Thus, all publicly held firms must file annual and quar-
terly financial statements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which are then made publicly available without charge through the Elec-
tronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR).260  Individu-
als who purchase securities products must be provided with a prospectus for the 
product that discloses all material risks.261  And regulated entities must promptly 
disclose any information suggesting the prospect of a deteriorating financial con-
dition.262 
A similar embrace of transparency could improve the effectiveness of insur-
ance solvency regulation.  Insurance consumers, particularly life insurance con-
sumers, care substantially about the solvency of their carriers.  This consumer pref-
preference means that there is already a great deal of market discipline with respect 
to insurers’ solvency.263  Increasing the availability of information about insurers’ 
solvency would improve this market discipline by removing the primacy of rating 
agencies in intermediating this information to the marketplace.  Indeed, for these 
very reasons, one of the three “pillars” of Solvency II, the European system for sol-
  
256. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS., INSURANCE GUARANTEE ASSOCIATIONS: FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (2010), https://www.acli.com/Tools/Industry%20Facts/ Guaranty%20Associations/ 
Documents/c9dc45c2ea7344a6b7ac0742ae89903fInsuranceGuarantyAssociationsFAQ_C1308_2
_0611010.pdf. 
257. Grace & Scott, supra note 255.  
258. See Jon S. Hanson & Duncan R. Farney, Life Insurance Companies: Their Promotion and 
Regulation, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 175, 311–12 (1965) (comparing the minimal amount of risk 
information that must be disclosed to an individual who purchases a life insurance policy for a 
single premium to the significant amount that must be disclosed to an individual who invests 
an equivalent amount in the stock of the company). 
259. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 82, at 669. 
260. See generally STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2011). 
261. See generally id. 
262. See generally id. 
263. See Scott E. Harrington, Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE, supra note 250, at 87. 
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vency regulation that is currently under construction, is transparency.264  Improv-
ing transparency might also increase regulatory accountability and limit the risk of 
regulatory forbearance in the face of a failing insurance company.265 
2. Summary Disclosure 
An additional, though admittedly more contestable, way in which state sol-
vency regulation wrongly eschews transparency-based regulation involves sum-
mary disclosure.  State law does not require insurers to disclose in summary form 
to consumers any information about their financial strength.266  Such a require-
ment could easily piggyback on the financial strength ratings that firms like A.M. 
Best and Moody’s produce, which are generally easy to understand because they 
aggregate a tremendous range of information into a single metric.267  While carri-
ers with strong ratings actively advertise that fact, many consumers unknowingly 
purchase coverage from poorly rated carriers.268  Requiring disclosure of this in-
formation could improve market discipline as well as the matching of consumers 
with insurers who meet their price/quality preferences. 
To be sure, there are various legitimate objections to this proposal.  Most 
importantly, the fact that the insurers who are rated are also the ones who pay rat-
ing agencies undermines the reliability of financial ratings.269  The 2008 financial 
crisis illustrated this point well.270  Additionally, entrenching the role of rating 
agencies in financial regulations may exacerbate the problem by enhancing their 
power and thus insurers’ incentives to game these ratings.271 
Despite these criticisms, it ultimately makes sense to mandate that insurers 
disclose their financial-strength ratings to consumers.  The relevance of these rat-
ings to consumers is undeniable, even though the ratings are also imperfect.  
  
264. THERESE M. VAUGHAN, POLICY BRIEF. NO. 2009-PB-03, THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
SOLVENCY II FOR U.S. INSURANCE REGULATION 6 (2009), available at http://www.naic.org/ 
Releases/2009_docs/090305_vaughan_presentation.pdf.  
265. See id. 
266. See The Need to Disclose to Consumers the Financial Ratings of Insurance Companies, 36 INS. F. 
265, 266 (2009). 
267. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking.  See generally 
Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, Property-Liability Insurer Financial Strength 
Ratings: Differences Across Rating Agencies, 66 J. RISK & INS. 621 (1999). 
268. See The Need to Disclose to Consumers the Financial Ratings of Insurance Companies, supra note 266. 
269. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 50–51 (2004). 
270. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 3 (explaining how rating agencies rated securities backed 
by subprime mortgages as largely risk free in part because of the profitability of doing so). 
271. See Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Krueger, the Credit-
Rating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. 
ON REG. 431 (2009). 
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Moreover, these ratings may be harder to game than other types of financial rat-
ings, as insurance regulators independently assess insurers’ financial strength.  As 
such, if an insurer earned a financial rating that was wildly undeserved, regulators 
would be able to spot this discrepancy rather easily.  This, in turn, means that rat-
ing agencies in the insurance sphere are likely to be much less willing to game the 
system than they were in the context of specific mortgage products or for firms 
like Enron, whose financial health was not the subject of independent scrutiny.272 
In contrast to insurance policyholders, purchasers of insurance company se-
curities receive financial strength ratings, which are deemed material to them.273  
To be sure, these are provided not in summary form, but in a detailed prospectus.  
Although insurers are not required to provide financial-strength ratings in man-
datory consumer disclosures under U.S. law, other countries do indeed have such 
requirements in the insurance sphere.274 
B. Informing Consumers About Guarantee Fund Protection 
In addition to regulating insurers’ financial capacity to pay claims, states also 
require insurers to be members of guarantee funds.  These funds protect policy-
holders against the prospect that their insurer will not have sufficient funds to pay 
claims.275  As with solvency regulation, while these guarantee funds provide an 
important safety net to policyholders in all lines of insurance, their importance is 
arguably heightened in the life insurance context because of the long-term nature 
of this policy line. 
Despite the importance of guarantee funds to consumers, most states af-
firmatively restrict insurers and their agents from informing consumers of the ex-
tent of guarantee fund protection they enjoy.  Indeed, the NAIC model law on 
the topic, which most states have adopted, prohibits advertising the existence of a 
state’s Insurance Guaranty Association for the purpose of sales, solicitation, or 
inducement to purchase insurance.276  The law does require policyholders receive 
at the time of policy delivery—several weeks after purchase—a summary disclo-
sure describing the general purposes and limitations of the fund.277 
  
272. See Hill, supra note 269, at 75–76. 
273. The Need to Disclose to Consumers the Financial Ratings of Insurance Companies, supra note 266. 
274. See Martin Eling & Ines Holzmüller, An Overview and Comparison of Risk-Based Capital 
Standards, 26 J. INS. REG. 31 (2008) (reporting such a requirement in New Zealand). 
275. Grace & Scott, supra note 255, at 90. 
276. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 520-34, § 19 (2009). 
277. Id. 
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Although the purpose of these gag rules is to limit moral hazard,278 they 
have the impact of undermining the capacity of consumers to make informed de-
cisions among competing life insurance carriers.  Providing information about 
guarantee fund protection after policy purchase does virtually nothing to help 
consumers make informed decisions about their products in light of guarantee 
fund protection.279  Yet accurate information about guarantee fund protection is 
vital to consumers looking to choose life insurance products that match their 
preferences.  This is because the extent of the guarantee fund protection that 
life/annuities policyholders enjoy varies significantly by state and by product and 
is often woefully insufficient to protect even an average consumer’s policy rights 
fully.  For instance, with respect to life insurance death benefits, most states pro-
vide only $300,000 of protection, with some states providing up to $500,000 of 
protection.280  In the case of life insurance cash-surrender and cash-withdrawal 
protection, most states cap protection at $100,000, but some have substantially 
larger caps.281  With respect to annuities, some states provide only up to $100,000 
of guarantee fund protection, many provide up to $250,000 of protection, and 
some provide $300,000 or $500,000 in protection.282  There is good reason to be-
lieve that consumers who are informed about these levels of protection at the time 
they are selecting a product will more carefully scrutinize their insurer’s financial 
status to the extent they are not fully covered.283  Alternatively, just as consumers 
routinely do in banking, they may alter the amount of their purchase and/or the 
product they purchase in order to maximize the extent of their protection. 
Once again, the lack of transparency with respect to state guarantee funds is 
put into sharp relief when state insurance law is compared to analogous federal 
law.  In particular, bank depositors enjoy federal protection from the risk that 
their bank will become insolvent through FDIC insurance.  Yet banks routinely 
and prominently advertise this protection to depositors—something that the 
  
278. The moral hazard that Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance creates for 
policyholders in the banking sphere is well understood.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, Anatomy of a 
Disaster: Why Bank Regulation Failed, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 742 (1992). 
279. See supra Part I.A, An Overview of Transparency-Oriented Consumer Financial Protection. 
280. See PETER G. GALLANIS, NAT’L ORG. LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASS’NS, THE LIFE & 
HEALTH INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION SYSTEM, AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 
2008–2009 (2009), available at http://www.nolhga.com/resource/file/NOLHGAandFinancial 
Crisis.pdf. 
281. See id. 
282. See id. 
283. See Martin F. Grace et al., Homeowners Insurance With Bundled Catastrophe Coverage, 71 J. 
RISK & INS. 351, 377 (2004) (showing that consumers with homes that are more expensive 
than the guarantee fund protection limit are more sensitive to the financial strength of their 
insurance carrier). 
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FDIC requires them to do.284  Banks also advise depositors on strategies to max-
imize protection, such as holding a joint account or holding an account with mul-
tiple beneficiaries.  Moreover, when banks sell products unprotected by FDIC 
insurance they routinely warn consumers of this fact.285 
C. Informing Consumers About Annuity Terms and Conditions 
Because of their complexity and variability, annuities raise a host of con-
sumer protection problems.  At their core, annuities are contracts wherein an in-
surer promises a policyholder a series of future payments in exchange for receiving 
an earlier lump sum payment, or series of payments, from the policyholder.  But 
the details surrounding this basic framework can vary in an almost infinite set of 
ways.  These include (1) whether insurer payouts are immediate or deferred; (2) 
whether policyholders contribute in a lump sum or over time; (3) the ways in 
which money placed in the annuity earns a return; (4) the guarantees associated 
with insurer payments; and (5) the existence of market-based adjustments to in-
surer payouts.286 
This complexity raises two risks for consumers.  The first is that a consumer 
may purchase an annuity that is not well suited to her particular needs.287  The 
suitability of a particular annuity product depends on innumerable consumer de-
tails, including anticipated lifespan, savings, future financial needs, and retire-
ment plans.288  Second, the complexity of annuities can undermine competition 
across companies, resulting in excessive fees and/or poor investment perfor-
mance.  Indeed, according to one source, annuity fees average about 2.51 percent 
of one’s investment, a dramatic difference from the low-cost mutual fund options 
that are available for fees of 0.2 percent.289 
  
284. See generally CARNELL ET AL., supra note 1. 
285. See generally id. 
286. See generally SCOTT HARRINGTON & GREGORY NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
INSURANCE 297–334 (2004). 
287. In 2005, a class action lawsuit was filed against insurer Allianz claiming that the company 
sold actuarially unsuitable annuities to elderly consumers.  Chris Serres, A Split Decision in 
Allianz Life Annuity Lawsuit, STAR TRIB., Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/ 
business/64089107.html. 
288. See FINRA Rule 2111: Suitability, FINRA.ORG, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display 
_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (last updated Feb. 4, 2013). 
289. Margaret Collins, Variable Annuities: Lifelong Income, High Cost, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, June 23, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_27/ 
b4235047436378.htm.  As one consumer-finance expert explained, experts understand the 
“flip side to the annuity sales pitch—including the high costs; the long surrender periods with 
the resulting high surrender fees; and that many annuity sales are inappropriate because more 
suitable low-cost investment options are available.”  Mel Lindauer, Annuities: Good, Bad or 
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To address these concerns, state insurance regulation relies on two strate-
gies.  First, it requires that insurers obtain personal information from prospective 
customers before a sale and evaluate whether the annuity being sold is “suitable” 
for that particular individual.290  Second, and of more direct relevance here, state 
law requires certain disclosures to be made to annuity consumers.  This dual regu-
latory strategy is sensible.  On one hand, disclosures are not sufficient to protect 
consumers because annuities are extremely complex and multifaceted products.291  
On the other hand, though, mandatory disclosures can provide regulatory bene-
fits that suitability rules cannot, such as promoting competition and helping con-
sumers ensure that an annuity is not merely suitable for their needs, but optimal. 
Unfortunately, the NAIC’s annuity disclosure regime violates each of the 
three principles of effective disclosure described in Part I.  The annuity disclosure 
strategy is based on an NAIC model law dating back to 1999.292  Under the law, 
purchasers must receive both (1) a Buyer’s Guide and (2) a disclosure document.  
The Buyer’s Guide, created by the NAIC, describes the basic structure and gen-
eral features of annuities.  The disclosure document is a company-drafted form 
that must contain a description of specific contract terms and “emphasiz[e] its 
long-term nature.”293  The law also includes a lengthy section placing strict guide-
lines on the form and the content of illustrations used to describe annuities.294 
Perhaps the most central deficiency of this disclosure regime is that it does 
not rely on a single disclosure template used by individual firms but instead allows 
insurers to design their own disclosure documents.  While disclosures must in-
clude certain information, this information need not be labeled in any particular 
way, presented in the same location on different carriers’ forms, or subjected to 
consumer testing.  As explained in depth earlier, this inhibits consumers’ ability 
  
Ugly?, FORBES, June 4, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/04/variable-annuities-high-
cost-surrender-fees-personal-finance-bogleheads-view-lindauer.html. 
290. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 275-1 §6 (2010), 
available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-275.pdf.  Only two states have not 
adopted this law: Mississippi and New Mexico.  NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS 
AND GUIDELINES 275-1 State Adoption (2010).  This Article takes no position on the 
adequacy of the current suitability rules.  See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Pat A. McCoy, A 
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 
1316–17 (2002) (arguing for suitability rules in the mortgage context). 
291. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking (describing 
conditions under which mandatory summary disclosure may be appropriate and effective). 
292. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 245-1, § 1 (2010). 
293. Id. § 3(B). 
294. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 245-6 (2010). 
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to comparison shop.295  One prominent industry insider sums up the result: “Say 
you wanted to compare five products side by side . . . .  Good luck.”296 
The lack of any standardized disclosure document also undermines en-
forcement of the disclosure rules that do exist.  Despite the fact that individual 
companies design their own unique disclosure documents, these documents are 
not regularly submitted to or reviewed by regulators in most states.297  In fact, the 
only enforcement mechanism that most states employ to ensure compliance with 
applicable disclosure rules is market conduct exams.298  But such exams vary in 
frequency and are incredibly broad in scope, meaning that the amount of time 
that can be spent reviewing disclosure documents is minimal.299 
The annuity disclosure rule not only fails to provide a usable and uniform 
disclosure document but the information that it requires insurers to place in their 
disclosures is simultaneously excessive and deficient.300  The disclosure document 
must include countless warnings and complex pieces of information about con-
tract conditions and terms.301  These requirements include information about ac-
cessing the current value of the contract, surrender fees,302 tax implications of 
  
295. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking (describing the 
importance of uniform disclosure templates for mandatory summary disclosures). 
296. Collins, supra note 289; see also Tom Lauricella, Annuity Shopping Made Easier, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
10, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704442404575542590138626652.html 
(“Retirees have generally had to depend on insurance agents to get information about 
annuities, where the choices they offer can be influenced by incentives for recommending a 
certain company’s products or one kind of annuity over others.  As a result, doing true 
comparison shopping has been a headache at best.”); Annuity Disclosure Initiative: Frequently 
Asked Questions, OHIO DEP’T INS., http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Company/Documents/ 
AnnuityDisclosureFAQs.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (“Information contained in a 
contract can vary from one insurer’s annuity to another, making comparisons difficult.  State 
disclosure laws also differ.”); Darla Mercado, Lifetime-Income Options Pose Tough Benchmarking 
Puzzle, INVESTMENT NEWS (Oct. 30, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/ 
article/20111030/REG/310309967 (“The difficulty in benchmarking lifetime-income products 
stems from the fact that no two are exactly alike.”). 
297. This contrasts with the annuity contracts that life insurers sell, which generally must be 
submitted to and approved by insurance regulators before their sale. 
298. Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Ch. 19⎯Conducting the Life and Annuity Examination, in 
MARKET REGULATION HANDBOOK (May 24, 2011) (unpublished book chapter) (on file 
with author). 
299. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, INSURANCE MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION 
PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW pt. V (2000), available at http://www.ncoil.org/policy/V-Summary 
.html (“There is an extensive range of topics, views and activities in insurance market conduct 
surveillance.”). 
300. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking (emphasizing 
the limited amount of information that can be effectively disclosed to consumers). 
301. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 245-1 § 3(B) (2010). 
302. Id. § 3(B)(3)(d)–(e). 
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withdrawals,303 guaranteed and nonguaranteed elements of the contract,304 the 
calculation of the initial interest rate and the guaranteed minimum rate,305 and 
the calculation of death benefits and the operation of any riders to the contract.306  
Much of this information is useful only to a consumer with a relatively high de-
gree of financial sophistication.  This is particularly true of disclosures related to 
the calculation of rates or benefits.  All this information appears alongside much 
more fundamental disclosures related to the basic functioning of the annuity’s 
fees and penalties.  While the NAIC rules require excessive disclosure in some ar-
eas, they contain notable omissions in others.  In particular, they make no at-
tempt to distill the various costs and interest rates of an annuity into a single 
figure to facilitate comparison.307 
Yet another failing of the NAIC’s disclosure strategy is that it does not en-
sure that the relevant documents find their way into consumers’ hands in time to 
be helpful.308  Delivery of the Buyer’s Guide and disclosure documents can take 
place at any time up until the point of sale, meaning that the documents may not 
be delivered until a consumer has already emotionally and mentally committed to 
the purchase.309  If the sale does not take place in a face-to-face meeting, the doc-
uments can be delivered after the purchase, as long as the buyer is given a fifteen-
day penalty-free period to return the contract.310  And in the case of online pur-
chases, the NAIC rule requires only that the insurer take “reasonable steps” to 
make these documents viewable and printable from its own website.311 
Disclosure efforts in comparable regulatory domains suggest the inadequacy 
of these efforts.  Consider the SEC’s work on consumer disclosures of mutual 
funds and variable annuities, which directly compete with state-regulated annui-
ties.312  To be sure, these efforts have been far from ideal, and they have prompted 
quite compelling calls for reform.313  But they nonetheless are far more sensible 
and sophisticated than the state-based annuity disclosure regime described above.  
  
303. Id. § 3(B)(3)(g). 
304. Id. § 3(B)(1)–(3). 
305. Id. § 3(B). 
306. Id. § 3(B)(3)(f), (h). 
307. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking (emphasizing 
the importance of distilling complex information into tractable pieces of information). 
308. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking (emphasizing 
the importance of the timing of the disclosure). 
309. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 245-4 § 5(A) (2010). 
310. Id. 
311. Id.  
312. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Fatal Flaw of Proposals to Federalize Insurance (Univ. of St. 
Thomas Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008993. 
313. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 80. 
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Most notably, the SEC requires all mutual funds to provide investors with a 
“summary prospectus” that is at the front of the overall prospectus.314  The docu-
ment is limited to several pages and contains the key pieces of information that 
mutual fund investors should consider.315  This information is written in plain 
English and displayed in a standardized order and format.316  This layered ap-
proach to disclosure makes detailed information that may be of interest to sophis-
ticated investors available in the larger prospectus, without burdening ordinary 
investors with these details.317  For the last four years, the SEC has also been 
working on a comparable standardized summary prospectus document for varia-
ble annuities, though it has not yet released the proposal.318 
Additionally, unlike state insurance regulators, the SEC requires all disclo-
sure documents associated with either mutual funds or variable annuities to be 
filed with the agency.319  It then reviews those documents carefully for accuracy 
and compliance with the SEC’s rules.  As one SEC official explained: “Many of 
these products are very complex in their design and operation, making it very im-
portant that insurers provide clear and useful disclosure regarding how the prod-
ucts work and the risks of investing in them.  For that reason, the Division 
carefully reviews these disclosures in its review of registration statements.”320 
To be sure, crafting a uniform, summary disclosure of annuities is likely to 
be a difficult task.  But there is already at least one decent model for such a docu-
ment: The American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) has released a series of 
universal templates for annuity disclosures.321  Of course, because the ACLI tem-
  
314. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RIN 3235-AJ44, ENHANCED DISCLOSURE AND NEW 
PROSPECTUS DELIVERY OPTION FOR REGISTERED OPEN-END MANAGEMENT 
INVESTMENT COMPANIES (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-
8998.pdf. 
315. See id. 
316. See id. 
317. See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking (emphasizing 
the importance of layered disclosure). 
318. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Director of Investment Management 
publicly endorsed the creation of a “variable annuity short form disclosure document” and the SEC’s 
chair acknowledged that the SEC was actively developing such a document.  See INSURED 
RETIREMENT INST., VARIABLE ANNUITY SUMMARY PROSPECTUS HIGH IN DEMAND BY 
CONSUMERS: AN EXAMINATION OF CONSUMER PREFERENCES, INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES, 
AND IRI INITIATIVES (2011). 
319. See Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Remarks at the 2010 ALI-ABA 
Conference on Life Insurance Company Products (Oct. 28, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch102810ajd.htm). 
320. Id. 
321. AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS ET AL., IMPROVING ANNUITY DISCLOSURE: A LIFE 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE (2008), http://www.acli.com/Issues/Documents/75fd8 
a4aa0c344f9983e03c1f4e042d3DisclosureTemplataesOhio_nva.pdf. 
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plates are building off the NAIC’s previous work, they share some of the funda-
mental flaws of the NAIC approach—most notably, they still rely on dense text 
descriptions of the products in question.  But they also represent a significant step 
toward solving the most notable problem with the NAIC law: its failure to create 
a standardized summary disclosure format universal to all annuities in a product 
class.  Not only do the ACLI templates use an identical format for products of 
the same type, they use very similar formats for products of different types, help-
ing consumers conduct comparisons across product classes.  Unfortunately, use of 
the ACLI’s templates is entirely discretionary.322 
D. Improving Consumer Understanding of the Cost of Cash-Value  
Life Policies 
Although controversy regarding appropriate disclosure of cost in life insur-
ance markets dates back to at least the 1960s, state rules have long failed to re-
quire any simplified disclosure of price terms analogous to the ubiquitous annual 
percentage rate (APR) of credit products.  To appreciate this issue, some back-
ground is needed.  Life insurance policies can either be term or cash value.  
Term-life insurance is a relatively homogenous product: Carriers promise to pay 
a specified death benefit for a set premium over a specified period of time.323  By 
contrast, cash-value life insurance products are extremely heterogeneous and 
complex.324  At their core, though, these policies combine a term-life insurance 
policy with a savings or investment component.  As the savings/investment com-
  
322. Both Iowa and Ohio have adopted pilot programs to encourage use of the forms—most 
notably, by presuming that any insurer who uses the templates has already satisfied the states’ 
disclosure requirements—but there has been no state or regulatory agency that has simply 
mandated use of the template.  See, e.g., AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS ET AL., 
TEMPLATES FOR IMPROVING ANNUITY DISCLOSURE: OHIO PILOT PROGRAM (2008), 
https://www.acli.com/Issues/Pages/GR09-120.aspx; OHIO DEP’T OF INS., OHIO JOINS 
INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE ANNUITY DISCLOSURE, http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/ 
Company/Documents/AnnuityDisclosureFactSheet.pdf. 
323. See generally KENNETH BLACK, JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, LIFE INSURANCE (11th ed. 1987). 
324. The most basic cash-value policies are “whole life.”  These policies generally pay a fixed death 
benefit and have level premiums that are paid out either for the life of the policy or for a 
preset number of years.  As the savings component of the policy increases, the insurance 
component decreases in order to keep the death benefit constant.  In contrast to whole-life 
policies, variable-life policies link the death benefit to the performance of investment options 
selected by the policyholder.  Universal life policies, by contrast, have variable premiums that 
can be shifted, within various parameters, by the policyholder during the policy term.  The 
savings component accumulates based on stated interest rates that the insurer can vary and 
policy expenses are deducted from the account on a monthly basis.  Variable universal policies 
combine these features, with return on the universal policy based on the performance of 
policyholder-selected investment options.  Id. 
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ponent of the policy grows, it increasingly funds the death benefit, thus allowing 
premiums to remain level as the policyholder becomes older.  During his or her 
lifetime, the policyholder can access the savings component of the policy in vari-
ous ways, including by surrendering the policy and potentially paying some pen-
alty or by taking out a loan secured by the policy’s value.  If the policy is 
“participating,” it may also pay out dividends to the policyholder.325 
The combined savings and insurance components of cash-value policies 
make it very difficult for consumers to compare different policies.  This is because 
the premiums of cash-value policies do not, in fact, reflect the costs of these poli-
cies.  Instead, in order to evaluate cost, one must assume a specified savings rate 
and then extrapolate cost on that basis.  Alternatively, one can specify a particular 
cost for the insurance component of the policy, and then measure the rate of re-
turn.  Either way, though, a policy can have relatively high premiums but be 
quite affordable/high-return or a policy can have relatively low premiums but 
be quite expensive/low-return.326 
Whereas markets in term-life insurance are extremely competitive, the 
complexity of cash-value insurance policies has impeded beneficial competition.  
An important Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study from the 1970s found 
that cash-value life insurance policies routinely paid a substantially lower rate of 
return than comparable savings vehicles and that price dispersion of these policies 
was much larger than price dispersion for similar products.327  A more recent 
study of the life insurance industry by two prominent economists found that the 
price of term-life insurance policies decreased dramatically—between 8 and 15 
percent—in the mid-1990s because of the development of Internet tools that 
easily allowed consumers to compare different policies.328  By contrast, the price 
of cash-value policies did not fall at all during this period, and may have actually 
increased.329  The reason, they suggest, is that Internet tools did not allow con-
sumers to compare the prices of different cash-value policies because of their 
complexity and heterogeneity.330 
  
325. Id. 
326. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, LIFE INSURANCE COST DISCLOSURE 70–71 (1979), 
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/197907lifeinsurancecost.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. 
327. Id. at 25–62; see also Spencer L. Kimball & Mark S. Rapaport, What Price “Price Disclosure”?: 
The Trend to Consumer Protection in Life Insurance, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 1025, 1026–27. 
328. Jeffrey R. Brown & Austan Goolsbee, Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive?: 
Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry, 110 J. POL. ECON. 481 (2002).   
329. Id. at 493–94.  One consequence of elevated insurance prices is decreased insurance protection.  As 
Kyle Logue has described, underinsurance in the life arena is a pervasive problem.  See Kyle D. 
Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 23–
26 (2001). 
330. Brown & Goolsbee, supra note 328, at 493–94. 
450 61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014) 
 
 
The lack of price transparency in cash-value life insurance markets has also 
been the source of several acute consumer protection scandals in recent dec-
ades.331  In one particularly high-profile and widespread scandal, consumers were 
sold “vanishing premium” policies on the basis of representations that the savings 
components of these policies would grow at a sufficiently rapid rate to cover the 
cost of coverage.332  These growth rates were not achieved, causing policyholders 
to continue paying premiums well beyond the promised time horizon.  Smaller-
scale, but repeated, scandals have erupted at various times as it has come to light 
that agents frequently encourage insurance policyholders to replace a cash-value 
policy with a different policy.333  Such replacements are often not in consumers’ 
interests because the cost of coverage is quite high in the first years of cash-value 
policies when much of the savings component of premiums is directed toward 
paying commissions and administrative expenses.334 
Despite these problems, current regulatory rules do not require any form of 
standardized disclosure of the cost of cash-value life insurance policies.335  This is 
all the more remarkable because the mechanism for making such a disclosure has 
been the source of study and refinement for nearly fifty years.  In 1966, Joseph 
Belth proposed a uniform scheme for the disclosure of cost information about 
cash-value life insurance policies.336  Shortly thereafter, U.S. Senator Phillip Hart 
held hearings on the topic and suggested a Truth in Life Insurance Bill that 
would mirror the recently enacted Truth in Lending Act.337  That law requires 
  
331. See Dwight K. Bartlett, III, Life Insurance Cost Disclosure: A Regulatory Viewpoint, 13 J. INS. 
REG. 433, 435 (1995) (explaining that the misleading nature of net cost method has come 
under increased scrutiny since the 1970s); Joseph Belth, Deceptive Sales Practices in the Life 
Insurance Business, 41 J. RISK & INS. 305, 305 (1974) (asserting that deceptive life insurance 
sales practices are widespread enough to constitute a national scandal). 
332. Tom Foley & Carolyn Johnson, Introduction to Symposium on the Regulation of Life Cost 
Disclosure and Market Conduct, 13 J. INS. REG. 398, 398 (1995). 
333. For instance, in 1975, Senator Stone introduced a bill that focused on his concern about Veterans 
who were moving in large numbers into new life insurance policies through conversion policies.  
Disclosure of Insurance Policy Information to Veterans: Hearings on S. 718 Before the Subcomm. on 
Hous., Ins. & Cemeteries of the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977).  In 1984 another 
hearing on policy replacements was held by Congress in response to evidence that conversion 
policy sales accounted for one out of every two cash-value policy sales.  James H. Hunt, Life Cost 
Disclosure: Prospects for True Reform, 13 J. INS. REG. 405, 407 (1995). 
334. See Hunt, supra note 333. 
335. See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 580-1 (2005).  These rules do 
require a policy summary to be delivered after the sale of coverage.  These mandatory 
disclosures suffer, however, from many of the flaws described above for annuity policy 
summaries: They are nonstandardized, delivered after the policy is purchased, and do not 
contain useful information. 
336. David R. Kamerschen & John J. Pascucci, The Retail Price Structure in American Life 
Insurance: Comment, 36 J. RISK & INS. 493, 493 (1969). 
337. Hunt, supra note 333, at 412. 
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lenders to disclose to consumers the APR of their loans, which encompasses all of 
costs of borrowing, including the interest rate and fees.338 
These efforts led to extensive scrutiny of life insurance cost disclosure and 
eventually to the NAIC, in 1976, adopting a model regulation on life insurance 
cost disclosure.  The model required disclosure at the time of policy delivery—
rather than before or at the time of sale—of various cost indices for life insurance 
policies.339  These included a surrender index that was intended to convey the cost 
of a policy if it was surrendered at specified times, a payment index that provided 
the cost of the policy if death occurred at certain times, and an equivalent level 
annual dividend that was intended to show the relative importance of assumed 
dividends in the two indices just described.340   
Although this disclosure approach was a small step in the right direction, it 
had numerous problems as well.  Many of these problems were described in the 
aforementioned FTC report on life insurance cost disclosure.  The FTC report 
noted that the NAIC approach presented consumers with “a bewildering array of 
numbers, most of which [were] of doubtful relevance to the average insurance 
consumer.”341  These numbers had no intuitive benchmark to allow a consumer 
to discern whether a particular index number was good or bad.342  Perhaps even 
more importantly, the indices were appropriate only for consumers comparing 
similar policy types: They did not allow consumers to compare different types of 
cash-value policies to one another or to term insurance.343  Finally, the FTC re-
port noted that the timing of the policy cost information was deficient, because it 
“should be provided at a time when a consumer is trying to decide which, if any, 
policy to buy—not after that decision has been made.”344  In the face of these 
problems, the chairman of the FTC testified to Congress in 1979 that “no other 
product in our economy that is purchased by so many people for so much money 
is bought with so little understanding of its actual or comparative value.”345 
In place of the NAIC model, the FTC suggested that consumers needed a 
single cost metric with which to compare different policies.  It proposed the Lin-
  
338. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667(e) (2012). 
339. Foley & Johnson, supra note 332, at 399. 
340. See FTC REPORT, supra note 326, at 130–31. 
341. Id. at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
342. Id. at 133. 
343. Id. at 126.  The reason, from an actuarial perspective, is that it fails to control for differing 
amounts of risk in policies that are compared.  Hunt, supra note 333, at 412–13. 
344. See FTC REPORT, supra note 326, at 163. 
345. See FTC Study of Life Insurance Cost Disclosure: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., 
& Transp., 96th Cong. 3 (1979) (statement of Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n). 
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ton Yield method as a mechanism to achieve this.346  This single metric can be 
used to compare similar and different types of policies, comes with an intrinsic 
yardstick because it represents annual rates of return, and shows negative returns 
in initial years that warn consumers not to surrender a policy within that period.  
To be sure, the metric is not without its problems, particularly because its calcula-
tion is highly dependent on both assumed future dividends and term insurance 
cost, which can be manipulated.347  Indeed, various alternatives to the Linton 
Yield index are possible and may, in fact, be superior, including a version of the 
metric that Belth originally proposed fifty years ago348 that would calculate the 
expected present value of premiums paid less the expected present value of all 
death benefits, policy dividends, and cash values.349 
Although numerous plausible approaches are possible for clearly disclosing 
the cost of cash-value policies to consumers, the NAIC ultimately chose to jetti-
son any requirement of life insurance cost disclosure.  In the wake of the FTC re-
port, the industry successfully lobbied Congress to statutorily bar the FTC from 
investigating life insurance without a request from Congress.350  Meanwhile, the 
NAIC refused to revisit its model law on policy costs even after the vanishing 
premium scandals of the early 1990s, during which time its emphasis shifted to 
regulating deceptive illustrations.  Eventually, in 2000, now convinced that the 
cost disclosures it provided were indeed as useless as the FTC report had indicat-
  
346. The report left open the prospect of retaining a single surrender index for comparison of 
similar policies if this could be combined with a reasonable benchmark.  See FTC REPORT, 
supra note 326, at 97–182.  This recommendation, however, was largely premised on the 
notion that many had already gained familiarity with this tool, and so that learning should 
not be dismissed.  That rationale no longer applies, of course, since the tool was never 
adopted. 
347. This method essentially measured the value of different policies by setting a cost for the term 
insurance component of policies, subtracting this from cash value premiums, and then 
calculating the average annual rate of return that would produce the cash value plus dividends 
that the policy pays at any point in time.  Id. at 120. 
348. See Hunt, supra note 333. 
349. Joseph M. Belth, The Relationship Between Benefits and Premiums in Life Insurance, 36 J. RISK 
& INS. 19 (1969).  Subsequent theoretical work has demonstrated that this index is far less 
manipulable than other indices and thus would tend to prevent insurer gaming of their 
policies to maximize index values.  See Ralph A. Winter, On the Choice of an Index for 
Disclosure in the Life Insurance Market: An Axiomatic Approach, 49 J. RISK & INS. 513 (1982).  
An alternative approach is to separately disclose the cost of coverage per $1000 of coverage 
and the rate of return on the savings component of the policy, in each case incorporating an 
assumed value for the other formula.  See Belth, supra; see also BREADWINNERS’ INS., 
http://www.breadwinnersinsurance.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (proposing a different 
approach to summary disclosure of cash-value life insurance cost). 
350. See Hunt, supra note 333, at 412. 
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ed two decades earlier, the NAIC quietly decided to eliminate any requirement 
that life insurers provide any cost disclosures at all.351 
Ultimately, of course, any price disclosure in life insurance markets would be 
both imperfect and insufficient.  Indeed, numerous critics of the APR measure 
have rightly pointed out that it is often mysterious to consumers and failed to 
warn them about the dangers of subprime mortgages.352  At the same time, the 
answer to these difficulties is to improve summary disclosure metrics, recognize 
their limitations, and employ complementary regulatory strategies to limit the 
risks associated with those limitations.  Instead, the NAIC chose simply to aban-
don all regulatory efforts to convey relevant pricing information to life insurance 
consumers. 
IV. UNDERSTANDING AND BREAKING THE PATTERN 
The pattern of consumer protection regulation in insurance is both anoma-
lous and troubling.  Instead of embracing disclosure and transparency, state in-
surance regulation actively resists it while maintaining various forms of consumer 
protection regulation that are much more aggressive and costly.  What can ex-
plain this pattern?  Subpart A of this Part considers this question, looking to the 
distinctive features of insurance as well as the uniquely state-based nature of its 
regulation.  Subpart B then argues that, whatever explains the pattern in the past, 
there is one clear way to disrupt it in the future: the clear and credible threat of 
federal preemption.  It argues that the most appropriate way to create this threat 
is by expanding the jurisdiction of the CFPB to encompass insurance. 
  
351. In 1993, when the NAIC was evaluating reforms to the regulation of policy illustrations, it 
decided not to attempt to improve these disclosures.  See id. at 420 (“[N]one of the extensive 
deliberations of the LDWG over the last two years has sought to supply consumers with an 
effective means of comparing cash value life insurance policies either to each other or to the 
alternative of buying term life insurance.”).  Then, in 2000, the NAIC voted to eliminate any 
model law requiring companies to calculate and disclose these indices to consumers.  See 
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 585-1, § 8 (2001) (“When the 
Optional Form of the Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation with Yield Index was 
adopted, the group recommended that each time the disclosure regulation was amended the 
alternative with the yield index should also be amended.  When the disclosure regulation was 
amended, all references to indices were deleted.  The working group clarified its intent with 
regard to the alternative with the yield index by voting to recommend its deletion from the 
list of official NAIC models laws.  2000 Proc. 3rd Quarter 88.”). 
352. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 43, at 761 (contending that the 2008 financial crisis was caused in 
part by the inadequacies of disclosure in the Truth in Lending Act). 
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A. Understanding the Lack of Transparency in State Insurance Regulation 
The political economy of state insurance regulation is complicated and 
multifaceted.353  As a result, one-dimensional diagnoses or explanations of the 
patterns described above are not possible.  At the same time, several distinctive 
features of state insurance regulation likely contribute to its tendency to ignore 
transparency-based regulation in favor of command-and-control regulation. 
First, industry influence over insurance regulators and the NAIC has un-
doubtedly substantially limited transparency-oriented reforms in insurance.  The 
industry has openly and vehemently resisted transparency with respect to the 
availability of MCAS data, the online availability of policy forms, the disclosure 
of price information in life insurance, and numerous other issues discussed 
above.354  Such unified industry resistance has a substantial amount of influence 
on state insurance regulators and lawmakers.355  The reasons are numerous.  The 
revolving door between top insurance regulation posts and lucrative industry jobs 
is a large problem in insurance regulation.356  In states that elect their insurance 
commissioners, insurance companies can also exert their influence through cam-
paign contributions.357  In addition, the industry’s superior technical resources of-
ten allow it to provide and analyze information in ways that far surpass the ca-
  
353. See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF 
INSURANCE (1988). 
354. See supra Part II.A, Full Disclosure of Claims Payment Practices (discussing industry 
resistance to MCAS disclosure); Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ 
Reasonable Expectations (discussing industry resistance to online access to policy forms); 
Part II.C, Full Disclosure of the Availability of Insurance Products for Low-Income and 
Minority Populations (industry resistance to HMDA-like data collection); Part II.D, 
Improving Consumer Understanding of the Objectivity of Independent Insurance Agents 
(discussing industry resistance to disclosure of agents’ conflicts of interest); Part III.B, 
Informing Consumers About Guarantee Fund Protection (discussing industry resistance to 
guarantee fund disclosure); Part III.D, Improving Consumer Understanding of the Cost of 
Cash-Value  
Life Policies (discussing industry resistance to life insurance cost disclosure). 
355. See J. Robert Hunter, A Failure of Oversight in Need of Rescue: Insurance Regulation, GOV’T L. 
& POL’Y J., Winter 2011, at 6 (exploring how excessive industry influence, limited consumer 
empowerment, and lack of regulatory will and resources combine to produce an ineffective 
regulatory regime).  For a recent review of regulatory capture theory, see PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW 
TO LIMIT IT, supra note 99. 
356. See Randall, supra note 110, at 629–34 (discussing industry influence over insurance reg-
ulators). 
357. Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Performance, Regulatory Environment and 
Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on State Insurance Markets, 
32 J. BANKING & FIN. 116, 121 (2008). 
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capacities of regulatory staff or the limited number of consumer advocates who 
operate in the insurance domain.358 
The more difficult question is why the industry uniformly resists market 
transparency, given that it would presumably benefit a subset of firms already of-
fering better products or prices.  More specifically, why do insurers that offer bet-
ter products, more reliable claims handling, or lower pricing fail to agitate for 
more robust regulatory transparency?  Part of the answer may be cultural: Insur-
ance is an industry that is almost uniquely built on proprietary information.359  
This arguably produces an almost knee-jerk reaction by those within the industry 
to resist regulatory efforts that may result in information revelation. 
Alternatively, high-quality insurers might worry that transparency could 
expose them to adverse selection by causing high-risk individuals to prefer their 
coverage.360  Although this concern is theoretically plausible, it is practically quite 
limited: Most insurance markets do not suffer from adverse selection and, in 
many cases, the consumers who are likely to be drawn to the most generous forms 
of insurance are actually relatively nonrisky, but quite risk averse.361 
High-quality insurers may also resist regulatory initiatives designed to pro-
mote market accountability to the extent that they can reach their target customers 
without regulation through advertising campaigns and networks of interme-
diaries.362  If so, they may have less reason to be concerned that some segment of 
consumers unwittingly purchases coverage from low-quality carriers.  Transparen-
cy-based regulation could therefore produce limited benefits for the firm itself 
while increasing regulatory compliance costs and potentially even eroding their 
market niche by causing low-quality competitors to improve their products and 
their pricing. 
Beyond industry influence, a second explanation for states’ resistance to 
transparency is that state regulators want to limit their own public accountability.  
As described above, the complexity of insurance inevitably demands various 
forms of substantive consumer protection regulation.363  Transparency in insur-
ance markets provides an important disciplining force on the exercise of this 
  
358. See Schwarcz, supra note 99 (discussing the limited number of advocacy organizations that 
operate in the life and property/casualty insurance domains); Wendy Wagner, Administrative 
Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1321 (2010) (discussing 
general phenomena of information capture). 
359. See François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 197 (Graham Burchell 
et al. eds., 1991). 
360. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 7 (2d ed. 2008). 
361. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1223, 1264–65 (2004). 
362. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1336–38. 
363. See Jackson, supra note 6. 
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regulation by allowing consumers and market intermediaries to identify its po-
tential failings.364  But while this is a social benefit that should simultaneously 
promote more effective regulation while reining in unnecessary regulation, it ex-
poses state regulators to greater public scrutiny, which they may prefer to avoid. 
Yet a third explanation for the inverted pattern of state insurance regulation 
is that state lawmakers do not have sufficient political incentives to promote 
transparency-based regimes.  Insurance regulators tend to be quite responsive to 
political issues that become salient to the public.365  But transparency tends not to 
be such an issue: Unlike substantive regulation, which directly targets regulatory 
problems, transparency-based reforms operate indirectly by harnessing market 
forces to prevent regulatory problems.366  If consumers do not fully appreciate this 
value of transparency, state lawmakers may face limited incentives to implement 
such reforms.367 
A final explanation is historical: Insurance regulation was originally mod-
eled in large part on utilities regulation.368  Not only was insurance viewed as a 
practical necessity, but it was also understood to have features of a natural mo-
nopoly because of the need for individual companies to pool and share their his-
toric loss data in order to make accurate future projections.369  Utilities regulation 
tends to focus predominantly on the regulation of rates, as well as various other 
forms of substantive regulation.370  Insurance was thus originally understood to 
require a similar regulatory approach.  From this origin, state regulators may have 
simply continued to rely on substantive regulation rather than transparency. 
B. Toward More Transparent Insurance Markets 
Although the political economy of state insurance regulation is indeed 
complicated and multifaceted, one consistent force has tended to promote effec-
tive regulatory reforms.  Over the last century, glaring inadequacies in state insur-
ance regulation have tended to persist unless and until states are threatened with 
the risk of losing their regulatory authority.  Once a credible threat of federal 
preemption emerges, however, state insurance regulators often prove quite capa-
  
364. See supra Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations. 
365. See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The Perfect Storm: Hurricanes, Insurance, and 
Regulation, 12 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 81, 81–83 (2009). 
366. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1267–68. 
367. This explanation is consistent with the pattern in securities law, as state blue sky laws tended to focus 
less on disclosure than on substantive regulation relative to federal securities regulation. 
368. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 668–73 (2013). 
369. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1270–72. 
370. See Abraham, supra note 368, at 668. 
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ble and effective.  In lieu of a complete federal takeover of state insurance regula-
tion, which remains unlikely, the best approach to promoting effective consumer 
protection regulation is to focus a bright federal spotlight on the transparency issue 
and back that up with a specific and credible threat of federal preemption. 
1. State Reform of Insurance Regulation in Response to Federal Scrutiny 
In a variety of regulatory domains, including banking and corporate law, 
state law has been consistently and dramatically influenced by the prospect that 
the federal government will exercise previously untapped authority.371  This 
threat of action typically causes states to bridge the gap between their laws and 
those that the federal government might enact.  Doing so decreases the benefits 
to the federal government of acting while simultaneously signaling to it that ex-
erting its power will be politically difficult.372 
Nowhere is this dynamic easier to see than in the context of state insurance 
regulation: The threat of federal preemption has been the primary driver of state 
insurance regulatory reform over the last century.373  Indeed, modern state insur-
ance regulation was largely forged in response to the Southeastern Supreme Court 
case, which opened the door to federal preemption by concluding that insurance 
was subject to Congress’s authority to regulate commerce.374  In the wake of that 
decision, the NAIC and the industry helped draft and pass the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which largely enshrined states as the regulators of insurance.375  
And in response to that Act, which limited states’ antitrust exemption if they 
failed to regulate the business of insurance, states developed and enacted a sub-
stantial portion of modern insurance regulatory law.376 
Since that time, virtually all substantial state insurance regulatory reforms 
can be clearly and directly traced back to acute threats of federal preemption.  
Consider solvency regulation, which is widely regarded to be the most important 
  
371. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking 
System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 678 (1988); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 601 (2003). 
372. See Roe, supra note 371. 
373. See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, The History of Federal Involvement in Insurance Regulation, in 
OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 21, 
21 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2000) (“The history of insurance regulation is characterized by a 
series of perceived market or regulatory failures, followed by threats of federal regulation and 
subsequent changes by the states that have helped forestall federal action.”). 
374. See United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 571 (1944); see also 
MEIER, supra note 353. 
375. See MEIER, supra note 353. 
376. See id. 
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and effective element of state regulation.377  The insurance solvency regime is 
centered on two core pillars: a risk-based capital requirement and a scheme of 
state accreditation, which is coordinated and enforced by the NAIC and several 
of its committees.378  Both reforms were developed and put into place only in the 
early 1990s, after several insurer insolvencies prompted a highly critical congres-
sional report and series of hearings.379  Similarly, state guarantee funds were put 
in place in response to a proposed Federal Insurance Act, which itself was 
prompted by several large insurer insolvencies.380 
Although state reforms in the solvency domain are the most important 
modern example of this process of federally triggered state insurance reform, nu-
merous other examples exist.  For instance, state regulators’ numerous efforts to 
limit the duplicative and overlapping nature of state insurance product require-
ments—including the Interstate Insurance Product Regulatory Commission and 
State Electronic Rate and Form Filing—were directly responsive to very public 
campaigns by certain large property/casualty insurers and life insurers for the 
adoption of an Optional Federal Charter.381  Similarly, recent efforts to limit the 
inconsistencies in state insurance producer licensing were triggered by a direct 
preemption threat contained within the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, which re-
quired a national scheme for producer licensing if states did not act.382  Perhaps 
most notably for present purposes, state lawmakers developed an excellent con-
sumer tool for disclosing the terms of health insurance policies after the ACA 
delegated this responsibility to them, subject to the approval of HHS.383 
  
377. See VAUGHAN, supra note 264. 
378. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, THE UNITED STATES INSURANCE FINANCIAL 
SOLVENCY FRAMEWORK (2010), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_us_solvency 
_framework.pdf.  States have very strong reasons to maintain accreditation because of the 
system’s ingenious design: Accredited states can only rely on the regulatory efforts of other 
accredited states.  Failing to maintain accreditation thus risks subjecting domestic insurers to 
duplicative regulation. 
379. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF COMM. ON ENERGY & 
COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES 
(Comm. Print 1990). 
380. See Brown, supra note 312, at 12–13. 
381. See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1779. 
382. Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 765–66 (2000). 
383. The ACA requires that Health and Human Services (HHS) consult with the NAIC in 
developing a Uniform Explanation of Coverage.  Working through a Consumer Information 
Working Group, with extensive involvement from consumer groups and with consumer 
testing of templates, the NAIC produced a very good disclosure template, which HHS 
accepted without change.  See Schwarcz, supra note 99.  The template is available online.  See 
Summary of Coverage, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/documents/ 
committees_b_consumer_information_soc_ppo_plan1_insurance_company1.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2013). 
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2. Expanding the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Jurisdiction  
to Encompass Insurance 
All of this suggests that the path to reform of state insurance regulation ul-
timately lies with federal actors.  If federal lawmakers do not push state lawmak-
ers and regulators to take market transparency seriously, they will not do so.  
Fortunately, there is a simple and sensible way for the federal government to cre-
ate an ongoing threat of preemption that depends on states making insurance 
markets more transparent. 
Federal lawmakers could amend Dodd-Frank to extend the CFPB’s juris-
diction to insurance markets.384  Ideally, such a jurisdictional extension would al-
low the CFPB to promulgate and enforce rules that the agency reasonably deems 
necessary to promote more transparent insurance markets.  The resulting regula-
tory framework would leave states as the primary insurance regulators, but it 
would create the prospect of preemption by the CFPB in cases in which states in-
adequately ensure transparency.385 
The CFPB would be well situated to take on this role of promoting more 
transparent insurance markets.  In fact, the CFPB currently devotes extensive at-
tention to ensuring market transparency in the domain of consumer credit.386  
Drawing on substantial empirical testing and analysis, it has already made mean-
ingful progress toward this goal: In the last several months, it has promulgated 
admirable disclosure rules for mortgages and established an online database of 
consumer complaints for credit card companies.387  Much of this work would be 
directly relevant to improving the transparency of insurance markets, as many of 
the challenges of communicating effectively with consumers and the larger public 
about credit and insurance are quite similar. 
Appropriately expanding the CFPB’s jurisdiction to encompass insurance 
could place substantial and ongoing pressure on state lawmakers and regulators to 
promote more transparent insurance markets.388  So long as the CFPB’s authority 
to promulgate rules in the insurance domain was dependent on a preliminary deter-
  
384. Currently, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act explicitly excludes insurance from the 
CFPB’s jurisdiction.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
§ 1002(3), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955 (2010). 
385. It would thus resemble the regulatory structure currently in place for state-regulated banks.  
See id.  
386. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS: FALL 2012 (2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-fall-2012.pdf. 
387. See Kennedy et al., supra note 28, at 1160–67. 
388. Although numerous insurance regulators exist at the state level, they are not currently subject 
to meaningful regulatory competition because they have exclusive authority over insurance 
transactions that take place within their border.  See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1708–09. 
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mination of inadequately transparent insurance markets, states would have a strong 
incentive to enhance market transparency proactively.  Doing so would limit the 
risk that the CFPB would impose new rules or restrictions, both because such ef-
forts would have less impact and because states would be better positioned to 
challenge them in court.  So long as the CFPB’s statutory grant of power were 
appropriately drafted, a court could strike down any attempted exercise of the 
CFPB’s insurance authority if the agency did not, in fact, have a reasonable basis for 
believing its rules were necessary to promote more transparent insurance markets. 
To the extent that extending the CFPB’s jurisdiction to insurance failed to 
prompt appropriate reforms at the state level, it would serve the alternative pur-
pose of facilitating a transition to the federalization of insurance regulation.  Fed-
eralizing insurance regulation is a perennial topic of discussion among 
policymakers,389 and many believe that Dodd-Frank took a partial step in that di-
rection by creating a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO).390  If such federalization 
ever were to occur completely, our recent history in the banking sphere strongly 
suggests that it would be appropriate to assign consumer protection responsibili-
ties to an agency such as the CFPB, which is independent of insurers’ primary 
prudential regulators.391  Providing the CFPB with preliminary authority to study 
and regulate the insurance domain could thus facilitate any such transition. 
3. Answering Objections 
Various important objections can be raised against expanding the CFPB’s 
jurisdiction to encompass insurance in particular.  First, many commentators 
have argued that transparency-oriented consumer protections have often had the 
effect of crowding out more effective substantive regulations.392  By embracing 
such regulatory approaches, lawmakers may create the appearance of having acted 
while preserving industry profit.393  A similar point could be made here: By focus-
ing state lawmakers on improving market transparency, the law may actually un-
dermine important substantive regulations such as mandated policy provisions or 
enhanced suitability requirements. 
  
389. See generally OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, supra note 373. 
390. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 313(a), 502(a). 
391. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86–95 (2008). 
392. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 651; Robert A. Hillman, Online 
Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L 
REV. 837, 843–45 (2006) (worrying that online disclosure of contract terms may undermine 
claims of unconscionability but have little positive effect); Sovern, supra note 43, at 785–86.  
393. See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership From 
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1825 (2011). 
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Although such objections are entirely reasonable as a political matter, this 
Article aims to dispel the false choice between transparency and substantive regu-
lation.  Its premise is that effective consumer protection often requires both sub-
stantive regulation and transparency.  There is no logical reason why these two 
regulatory approaches are mutually exclusive and, in fact, there are many ways in 
which they can be mutually reinforcing.  Arguably, this fact is reflected in the most 
important consumer protection developments in recent years.  Thus, the Credit 
CARD Act, the Affordable Care Act, and the Dodd-Frank Act all contain both 
new disclosure rules as well as meaningful substantive restrictions on firms.394  At 
the very least, these developments demonstrate that reforms aimed at promoting 
market transparency need not crowd out effective substantive regulation. 
A second objection is that the CFPB is not the ideal agency within which to 
lodge authority over insurance consumer protection.  The CFPB has been mired 
in controversy since its genesis and has engaged in an overwhelming amount of 
work reforming credit markets during its limited existence.  Moreover, the SEC 
arguably has more natural expertise in certain insurance products, as it already ex-
ercises jurisdiction over certain variable life and annuity products and focuses on 
promoting disclosure of firms’ balance sheets, which is an important component 
of insurance solvency regulation. 
There is little doubt that the SEC would indeed have some comparative ad-
vantages to the CFPB in promoting more transparency in insurance markets.  
This might be particularly true with respect to full disclosure strategies, which are 
much more consistent with the SEC’s approach to securities regulation generally.  
On balance, however, the CFPB seems to present a better option than the SEC 
because it has devoted substantial energy to promoting both full disclosure and 
individual consumer understanding of complex financial products.  Moreover, 
the CFPB’s youth has certain advantages: The SEC has endured numerous turf 
battles with state insurance regulators that could undermine its ability to work 
cooperatively with them.  No such history clouds the CFPB.  The CFPB’s youth 
also provides it with a distinctive amount of enthusiasm—a benefit that is par-
ticularly important given that the main goal of expanding federal authority to in-
surance consumer protection would be to create a credible threat of preemption 
that would spur state-based regulatory reform. 
  
394. See supra note 4. 
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CONCLUSION 
In many ways, state insurance regulation is uniquely aggressive in its ap-
proach to protecting consumers.  As a result, commentators have historically 
overlooked the fact that state insurance regulation systematically and consistently 
fails to promote the most basic consumer protection of all: market transparency.  
The resulting pattern of state insurance regulation is both costly and ineffective.  
It is time for the federal government to demand that states modernize their ap-
proach to consumer protection by effectively combining market transparency 
with substantive regulation in ways that truly promote consumers’ interests. 
